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INTRODUCTION

The law of regulatory takings-the constraint of the government's regulatory powers by the command of the Fifth Amendment
that "nor shall private property be taken without just compensation"l-has been a major preoccupation of the legal community for
several decades. 2 Judges, practitioners, and academics agree that the
rationales offered by courts to support their judgments in takings
cases are inconsistent.3 And yet, although takings law is doctrinally
vexed, actual takings cases are not particularly difficult. Hard cases
exist, as in any area of the law, but the vast majority of takings cases
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Unless otherwise indicated, "government" refers to
either state or federal government. Lore has it the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy PRB v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). See Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 n.5 (1994). But see id. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting); discussion infra nf. 128-33 and accompanying text. Neither Stevens nor anyone else appears to question the general proposition that the takings clause applies to
the states. In addition, most state constitutions contain a clause providing that takings
be compensated.
2 Much contemporary scholarship harks back to three articles: Allison Dunham,
Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967);Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
3 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging "great uncertainty" about the Supreme Court's takings
decisions); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978)
(noting the Court's difficulty in determining what constitutes a taking); BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) ("Indeed, in many conversations on the subject, I have not encountered a single lawyer, judge, or scholar
who views existing case-law as anything but a chaos of confused argument which
ought to be set right if one only knew how."); Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity
and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 21 (1997) ("The
law of takings, with its ever expanding subject matter, is a sprawling affair with very
little intellectual coherence."); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1524 (1991) ("[T]he Court's inability to move beyond ad hoc
inquiry and the undeniable difficulty of reconciling the Court's takings cases have
provided an irresistible challenge to scholars, who seek to impose order upon this
chaos"); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying PrinciplesPart
I-A Critique of CurrentTaking Clause Doctrine,77 CAL.L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989) ("[1]it
is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1697, 1698 (1988) ("IT]he future direction of takings law is very much in
doubt."). This critique is not new. See Dunham, supra note 2, at 63 (noting the
"crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court doctrine").
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are resolved in rather straightforward fashion. 4 This combination of
doctrinal confusion and relatively settled law presents, to those so inclined, a very seductive jurisprudential puzzle: how to express the abstract doctrine, to restate the law, in a way that explains all of the cases
and does not flatly contradict a Supreme Court pronouncement?
In 1964,Joseph Sax published Takings and the Police Power,5 one of
the first rivulets in the modem stream of academic writings on the
Takings Clause. Sax's article is significant in part because it set the
pattern for adopting what would come to be called a "Comprehensive
View" 6 of takings law. 7 With considerable labor, it would be possible

to make the case that every effort to take a Comprehensive View of the
case law has been unsuccessful. That labor would be the stuff of an-

4 This too has been noted by academic commentators. See Peterson, supra note
3, at 1304 ("[O]ne can often predict how the Court will rule in a takings case ....);
see also ACKERMAN, supra note 3, Chs. 5, 6 (arguing that takings law, for all its logical
incoherence, can be understood by reference to the socially formed understandings
of the "Ordinary Observer").
5 Sax, supra note 2.
6 See AcKEtmA, supra note 3, at 11.
7 See, e.g., id. at 4 ("Not for the first time in our constitutional law, it will be
impossible to resolve the legal issues without confronting, and resolving as best we
can, our philosophical perplexities."); id at 5 ("Philosophy decides cases; and hard
philosophy at that."). Ackerman admits, however, that his view "accords a role to
theory far greater than that granted generally by the profession." Id.See also Andrea
L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of UnderlyingPrinciples Part Il-Takings as
Intentional Deprivations of Property Without MoralJustification, 78 CAL. L. RErV. 53, 58
(1990) ("This predictability suggests that an unarticulated pattern underlies the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence. In this Article, I attempt to identify a set of
principles that account for and explicate that underlying pattern."). Peterson calls
the underlying pattern "unified," and "a single coherent set of principles," id., and
sets forth her intention "to provide a complete descriptive theory of when the Court
will find that a compensable taking of property has occurred." Id.at 61. She explicitly disclaims the possibility that case law might be understood in terms of principles
that were not unified. Id. at n.21. Should the reader be dissatisfied with her theory,
Peterson welcomes competing theories, see id. at 61, tacitly assuming that the only
response to theory is more/better theory. The present Article implicitly argues
against such ambitions to theory. Similarly, Richard Epstein has claimed that his
book, Takings, provides a complete takings theory, and that this is a good thing. See
Richard Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 253, 275 (1986).
But still again, more than a decade later, he said: "Theory comes first; case law interpretation and practical politics only after the conceptual underbrush is cleared away."
Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: The ErraticTakingsJurisprudence
of Justice Holmes, 86 GEO. L.J. 875, 876 (1998). Regrettably, according to Epstein,
Holmes' "insights are not disciplined by any overriding theoretical approach." Id. at
891.
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other article.8 Suffice it to say that theorists themselves are not satisfied with the results, and continue to find it necessary to produce
theoretical accounts of the takings cases. 9
I doubt there is a vantage point from which a Comprehensive
View can be taken, a Pisgah' 0 from which one can see the cases logically arrayed down upon the plain. Suits brought under the Takings
Clause concern not one but many aspects of government power, and
the various ways in which government should go about its business
cannot be unified within a single normative theory. This Article suggests a more pragmatic approach to takings law, and highlights some
of the insights that this approach affords."
A pragmatic approach to takings cases requires examination of
the practice of deciding such cases. 12 Regulatory takings claims-as
opposed to theories-are from the beginning demands for judicial
review of government action. Takings cases may raise great questions,
8 SeeJeanne L. Schroeder, NeverJam To-day: On the Impossibility of TakingsJurisprudence, 84 GEO. L.J. 1531 (1996). Schroeder uses Hegel to argue that a philosophically
satisfying takings jurisprudence is impossible, but that a pragmatic practice of takings
cases is not only possible but desirable. This Article is an effort to give some shape to
the pragmatic jurisprudence toward which Schroeder gestures.
9 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY (1990); John J. Costonis, "Fair"Compensation and the Accommodation Power:
Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021
(1975); John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings,
Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A
CriticalReexamination of the TakingsJurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992); Peterson, supra note 3; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J.
1077 (1993).
10 See Deuteronomy 34:1. Pisgah was the mountain from which God showed Moses
the Promised Land.
11 In recent years, a number of other commentators have also taken a self-consciously pragmatic view of takings law. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, InvestmentBacked Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 249 (1995) ("[Takings law] reflects a pragmatic judgment about the property interests that courts decide are worth
protecting under the Taking Clause. Nothing else is possible."); Richard H. Pildes,
Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520 (1992); Richard H. Pildes
& Elizabeth S. Anderson, SlingingArrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics,90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2184 (1990).
12 As the ur-realist Justice Holmes grandly stated: "The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). (What
could be more pretentious than prophecy?) On the importance of Holmes for the
Realists, see, for example, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 3-4 (William W. Fisher, III et al.
eds., 1993).
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such as the nature of private property13 or the tensions within a society that aspires to both democratic government and a respect for
property rights. 14 But even in such cases, courts must decide whether,
and if so how, they are to review the actions of coordinate branches of
government. Many substantive doctrinal difficulties noted by commentators on regulatory takings are not so difficult when analyzed
within this institutional context, that is, as legally sufficient decisions
rather than as inadequate philosophy. I begin this Article by examining takings cases in situ, as claims brought against an organ of the
government and reviewed by a court.
This Article has two theses. First, as the title suggests, regulatory
takings tend to be claims against the administrative actions of government. Part I describes how both the institutional context and the internal structure of takings suits incline courts to fact-specific review of
particular agency actions, rather than theoretically satisfying pronouncements on general legislation. Because takings cases tend, for
deeply embedded reasons, to be decided on the particularities of each
case rather than grand principle, takings law tends to be pragmatic at
the expense of internal consistency.' 5 The general lesson here is an
old one: legal process does much to define the substance of legal
discourse.
To say that takings law is pragmatically sensible rather than internally consistent, however, is not to say that the law is unprincipled.
The second thesis of this Article, to which Part II is devoted, is that the
judicial review of administrative action under the Takings Clause resembles the judicial review (often of legislative action) conducted
under the rubrics of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the great administrative law statutes. Takings cases turn
on familiar concerns, as opposed to some constitutional interest specific to the Takings Clause. I conclude by suggesting that the Takings
Clause is a constitutional device through which bureaucracy-the regulatory state-is held accountable.
13 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 7, at 61-76 (defining property); Sax, supranote
2, at 61 ("Since the question being asked is what sort of protection is to be given to
property, the initial task must be to develop a workable concept of what we mean
when we talk about property.").
14 See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1988)
("The war between popular self-government and strongly constitutionalized property
now comes to seem not containable but total.").
15 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("As we already
have said, this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.").
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The present account of takings law is realist in its focus on institutional context, specifically the process of judicial review. 16 Takings
law makes considerable sense if one remembers that cases are litigations before they become the raw material for articles, and that judicial opinions are written under the constraints that litigation imposes.
Takings claims are not made in a vacuum, and the opinions that decide them are not written on a blank screen. Perhaps because the
conflict between the property owner and the government is so dramatic, academic takings literature on the whole seems little concerned
with the problems of judicial review central to every claim that property has been taken withoutjust compensation. To understand takings
cases, attention should be paid to the political and institutional roles
of courts that sit in judgment on the activities of other organs of government. Takings jurisprudence is more successful, and more satisfying, when considered as the collective practice of the judiciary
reviewing government action rather than as an internally consistent
17
doctrinal edifice.
I.

THE

Focus

ON AGENCY ACTION IN REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES

A.

The Claim

The Fifth Amendment-not just the Takings Clause-regulates
the way in which the government applies its power to the individual.
The clauses proceed in descending order of gravity for the individual
affected by the government action-from a requirement for how the
16 Attention to judicial decision, as opposed to academic doctrine, is certainly a
hallmark of realism. Efforts to define realism more completely have been around as
long as realism itself. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding
to Dean Pound,44 HARV.L. REV. 1222, 1226-28 & n.18 (1931). Judging by the number
of contemporary efforts to define realism, a satisfactory solution to this problem has
yet to be found. Discussing or mentioning the work of a number of contemporary
scholars, including herself, Professor Kalman states that "I concede that none of us
have come up with a satisfactory definition of realism, but I contend that it is still a
useful category for historical analysis." Laura Kalman, Bleak House, 84 GEO. L.J. 2245,
2551 (1996) (reviewingJOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995)). See also LAuRA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 19271960 (1986); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 12 (collecting edited primary
sources with commentary); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV.
465, 476 n.40 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra) (defining realism through a bibliography of works he finds significant).
17 In his classic treatise, LouisJaffe similarly used the practice of review as a way to
understand administrative law. LouIsJAFFE,JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION (1965). A danger of this approach, of course, is that the unwary reader may
unselfconsciously, but still wrongly, understand appellate court pronouncement to be
the whole of the law.
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government may prosecute felonies (i.e., very serious crimes) to a
purely civil matter, the taking of property. 18 The Fifth Amendment
thus sets forth, if only in broad outline, a hierarchy of restraints on
how the power of the state is exercised, from irremediable capital
punishment to the exercise of imminent domain, easily to be remedied by a money payment.
Courts have long held that government regulation may take property, in the constitutional sense, even though the government does
not actually acquire title to or physical possession of the land or chattels at issue. 19 Such claims have come to be called "regulatory takings."
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, decided in 1922, the Supreme Court

held that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." While Pennsylvania Coal has generated a great deal of commentary, it is generally
considered to stand for the proposition that the Constitution may require compensation for government regulation of the uses to which
property may be put, even if such regulation is proper in every respect.20 At least since PennsylvaniaCoa4 therefore, a regulation can be
within the police power of the government, and nonetheless necessi18

The complete text of the Fifth Amendment is:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

19 Copious academic writing exists on the historical development of takings doctrine. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996); John F. Hart, ColonialLand Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109 HAiv. L. REV. 1252 (1996); William J. Novak,
Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061
(1994); Paul, supra note 3; Deborah K. Paulus, Reflections on Takings: The Watuppa
Ponds Cases, 17 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 29 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782
(1995) [hereinafter Treanor, Original Understanding];William Michael Treanor, The
Origins and OriginalSignificance of theJust Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94
YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
20 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Interestingly, a
cold reading of the case would not yield this holding. See discussion infranote 32 and
accompanying text; Brauneis, supra note 19. This is, however, the significance of
Pennsylvania Coal in U.S. legal culture.
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tate compensation for an individual whose property rights are ad21
versely affected.
In fact, courts usually do not find that a regulation that adversely
affects the value of property works a taking. Thus, the problem before
the courts in regulatory takings cases is to distinguish regulations that
"go too far" and so require compensation, from regulations that do
not. One solution to this problem, necessarily somewhat vague if the
question is considered in the abstract, is that judicial review under the
Takings Clause, as under the Fifth Amendment as a whole, is concerned both with how the government regulates and with what the
government regulates. In judging takings claims, "the way of government matters." 22 Courts decide whether regulatory activity preserves
or disturbs the proper relation between the government, representing
the collectivity of citizens, and individual members of a civil society.
Takings jurisprudence entails a right relationship between government and governed, in which both have their normal (i.e., both normative and usual) roles. When government acts outside its normal
role, in a manner that destroys private property rights, the Takings
Clause may require compensation for the owner.
A court may determine that government has acted outside its normal role and must compensate the affected property owner, even if
the government action is fully permissible. Indeed, the opinions in
takings cases often presume that the government action is not only
permissible, but well-intentioned. 2 3 In building a road, or regulating
the use of land, the government is presumably realizing worthy policy
objectives. The worthiness of the underlying policy, however, does
not relieve the government of its obligation to compensate.
On the other hand, the mere fact that the government deprives a
private individual of property does not suffice to create a taking.
Neither fines nor taxes are takings. 24 Maintenance of the criminal
21 The dominant late 19th and early 20th century understandings of the constitutional protection of private property appear to have been very different. The Takings
Clause (along with the Contract, Privilege and Immunities, and Due Process Clauses)
protected private property, and the police power governed the public realm, under
which neither property nor a takings claim was possible. There was, therefore, no
situation in which government both had authority to act under the police power, and
owed compensation under the takings clause. See Brauneis, supra note 19. But see
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
22 Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
23 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (noting that
although the city's goals were well-intentioned, just compensation was still required);
see also Michelman, supra note 14, at 1626.
24 "Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she
pays; yet, no one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the differ-
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justice system and the tax regime are normal activities of government,
that is, they are intended to be expressions of an appropriate relationship between the state and criminals, in the first instance, and between the state and its citizens, in the second. In contrast, the
exercise of imminent domain (either directly through the government's condemnation procedure, or indirectly through a property
owner's takings claim 25 ), is in some sense extraordinary.

The line between "normal" taxation and "extraordinary" taking is
necessarily normative. 26 It is logically consistent to assert that virtually
all exactions are transgressions of the appropriate relationship between the state and its subjects, i.e., most taxation should be compensable. 27 It is equally logical to maintain the precise opposite, that
government regulation inheres in civilized life, and it is merely whim28
sical to designate some exactions as requiring compensation.
Although both are logical, neither extreme is particularly sensible,
and it has been left to the courts to distinguish between ordinary and
29
extraordinary, fair and unfair, exercises of government power.
B.

The Ripeness of the Claim

It is frequently difficult for either the parties or the courts to determine when a course of bureaucratic action reorders property
rights, and is hence justifiable as a takings claim. The judicial review
of how another government organ exercises power is therefore often
ence between taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits received." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987).
25 Regulatory takings claims brought by landowners arguing that regulations are
confiscatory in effect have sometimes been called "inverse condemnation" actions.
See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
26 See Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitutionfor the Lost Commons: A Reply to ProfessorEpstein, 64 U. CH. L. REy. 57, 67 (1997) (The right to compensation "falls out of a judgment of political fairness: if, in the general context of
American constitutionalism, it is unfair for politics to impose on property in the challenged way without compensation, then property has been taken, and vice-versa.");
Sax, supranote 2, at 57 ("What seemed to concern the early writers was not the fact of
loss but imposition of loss by unjust means. It was the exercise of arbitrary or tyrannical powers that were sought to be controlled.").
27 See EpsmI, supra note 9.
28 See Kaplow, supra note 9.
29 Advocacy may play an important role in such characterizations. The claimant's
case in Pennsylvania Coal was argued before the Supreme Court by former Solicitor
General Davis, whose name still adorns the Wall Street firm of Davis, Polk & Wardwell. Justice Holmes said of Davis, "[o]f all the persons who appeared before the
Court in my time, there was never anybody more eloquent, more clear, more concise,
or more logical than John W. Davis." MARYANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAwYEs
34 (1994).
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deferred. In such cases, the issue litigated is not whether the government acted in its normal role with regard to property interests, but
whether the relationship between the claimant and the government is
sufficiently well-defined to permit such analysis. The cause of the uncertainty lies in the structure of the takings challenge to government
regulation of the use of property. A takings suit claims that "private
property" has been taken "without just compensation." 30 Therefore,
no takings claim can be stated until the government has (i) taken
property, and (ii) denied the owner compensation for the taking. 3 1
In practice, these determinations are often difficult to make.
Government regulation rarely takes property in obvious fashion and
administrative agencies rarely concede that property was taken. Agencies therefore have no need to refuse to pay compensation. As a result, claimants must argue both that property has in fact been taken,
and that the government's silence is a tacit refusal to pay compensation. For their part, judges seldom rush to answer constitutional questions. As a fundamental matter of constitutionaljurisprudence, courts
are to avoid resolution of controversies on constitutional grounds
whenever another just ground for decision presents itself.3 2 The
Court rejected a preenforcement takings challenge to the Surface
Mining and Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,33 in part because the property
owners had not sought administrative relief from the terms of the statute, relief which was provided for by the same statute. The Court
noted that if the property owners "were to seek administrative relief
under these procedures, a mutually acceptable solution might well be

30 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Professor Rubenfeld has argued that courts should pay
more attention to "public use" as a criterion for distinguishing compensable government actions, takings, from mere diminutions. See Rubenfeld, supra note 9.
31 See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
32 In his famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Justice
Brandeis wrote:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter.
Ashwander, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1991).
33 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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reached... thereby obviating any need to address the constitutional
'3 4
questions.
To be literal-minded, regulation of how the property owner may
use the property almost never takes the property, because the owner
retains title.35 As Holmes said, "if regulation goes too far, it will be
recognized as a taking."36 Holmes did not say, "if a regulation goes too
far, it will transfer title to the government." In the regulatory takings
context, the superficially simple question-did the government take
property-thus becomes the more difficult and open-ended question-when should the court hold that government actions constitute
a de facto destruction of the bundle of rights that comprise ownership?3 7 In order to evaluate the actual effects of the government's
regulation on the claimant's property, the government needs to have
acted, not merely threatened to act. There is thus a profound tendency to review only government actions that have in fact been applied to specific parcels or chattels, and to dismiss as unripe facial
challenges to statutes or regulations.
This hesitancy over whether a regulation should be characterized
as though it worked a taking of property is expressed both jurisdictionally and prudentially. Jurisdictionally, the Constitution requires
courts to review cases and controversies, not to speculate on prospective government action.3 8 Prudence generally requires courts to proceed on as fully developed a record as possible. 39 Controversy over
34 Id. at 297 (footnote omitted). In some cases, claimants may be able to show
that application for a variance would have been futile. See, e.g., Herrington v. County
of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), as amended & reh'g denied, 857 F.2d 567

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989).
35 Dolan v. City of Tigard,512 U.S. 374 (1994), involved an exaction of title to an
easement in exchange for a variance to a zoning ordinance. Thus, not the regulation,
but relief from the regulation, took title to property.
36 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added).
37 Pennsylvania Coa however, reached the statute prior to its application. See id.
at 394.
38 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; cf. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27
F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), affd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In addition, U.S. Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state high court cases requires a
final judgment of the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1998); see also San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
39 The ripeness doctrine is generally viewed as being both constitutionally required and judicially prudent. The constitutional mandate results from Article III's
requirement that federal courts hear only cases or controversies. The prudential restrictions result from the fact that most courts would rather avoid speculative cases,
defer to finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise, decide cases with fullydeveloped records, and avoid overly broad opinions, even if these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18
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whether claimant's loss is sufficiently certain to support a takings
claim may extend to the Supreme Court. 40 In Pennell v. City of San
Jose, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a claim that a rent
control ordinance, on its face, worked a taking because "there simply
is no evidence that the 'tenant hardship clause' has in fact ever been
relied upon ... to reduce a rent .... -41
It is nonetheless possible to conceive of a statute that would, without actually being applied, present a conflict ripe for adjudication.
42

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association

seemed to

be such a case. The Surface Mining Act regulates only one activity,
mining. The Court explained:
Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge, it presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to particular surface mining operations or its effect
on specific parcels of land. Thus, the only issue properly before the
District Court and, in turn, this Court, is whether the "mere enact43
ment" of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking.
Thus, while it is legally possible to bring a takings claim against a
regulatory statute prior to its application in a concrete situation, the
nature of the claim makes it difficult to succeed. 44 As the Court sum-

marized in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency:
(1993); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48
VAND. L. REv. 1, 11 (1995).

40 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 506 U.S. 1003 (1992) (particularly the dissenting opinions and the separate statement ofJustice Souter); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) (requiring "afinal
and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property"); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (holding that respondent's claim was not ripe
because he had not yet received a decision concerning his ordinance application nor
used the available state procedures for receiving just compensation); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 630 (1981) (holding that in the absence
of a final state court judgment, there is no appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (unanimous decision)
("[B] ecause the appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding the
application of the specific zoning provisions."); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). In Penn Centra4 the court dismissed a claim of
categorical takings: "Since appellants have not sought approval for the construction
of a smaller structure, we do not know that appellants will be denied any use of any
portion of the airspace above the Terminal." Id.
41 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1988).
42 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
43 Id. at 295.
44 But see Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S.Ct. 727 (1997).
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Such "facial" challenges to regulation are generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed, but face an
"uphill battle," since it is difficult to demonstrate that "mere enact[the owner] of economiment" of a piece of legislation "deprived
45
cally viable use of [his] property."
In claims founded on land use regulation, the Supreme Court
has not been satisfied with application of the law, but has required the
claimant to show that the effects of the regulation on the parcel could
not be avoided or ameliorated. For example, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,46 claimants challenged § 404 of the Clean
Water Act,4 7 which gives the Army Corps of Engineers the authority to
issue permits for building in wetlands. The Court denied the proposition that the "mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction" 48 worked a
taking:
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a
certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property
in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies
leaving the landowner free to use
that permission may be granted,
49
the property as desired.
This ruling highlights a basic theme of this Article: regulatory takings cases are judicial reviews of administrative agency action. Therefore, the ripeness of a case is determined by the finality of the agency's
action. The agency needs to have committed itself to a final decision;
agency discretion over the matter must be at an end. Ripeness doctrine ensures that the conflict between the property owner and the
agency is sufficiently well-defined for the judiciary to review the
agency decision. The Supreme Court made this explicit in Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency.5 0 Suitun owned a parcel near Lake
Tahoe. The parcel was within a planning district controlled by the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which had authority for land use
planning in the area. In 1989, Suitum applied for a permit to build a
residence on the property. The Agency determined that her land was
in a "Stream Environment Zone" and therefore could not be built
upon. Suitum was entitled, however, to Transferrable Development
Rights (TDRs) which, at least in theory, could be sold to a third party.
45
tions
46
47
48
49

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l PlanningAgency, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1666 n.10 (1997) (alterain original) (citations omitted).
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Cleanwater Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C. §1344.
Riverside, 474 U.S. at 126.
Id. at 127. See also MacDonald, Somer &Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340,

348 (1986).

50

117 S.Ct. 1659 (1997).
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In addition, Suitum was eligible for a lottery in which she was assured
of receiving further TDRs. The Agency argued that Suitum's takings
claim was not ripe because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs.
Therefore, the Agency argued, the magnitude of Suitum's loss could
not be known and the fact of whether there had been a taking could
not be ascertained. Until such a determination was possible, the
Agency argued, the case would remain unripe.
The Supreme Court disagreed. In its discussion of the "finality
requirement" (i.e., that agency action be final in order for a takings
claim to be ripe), 51 the Court noted two points. First, the requirement "applies to decisions about how a taking plaintiff's own land may
be used, '52 and second, the requirement "responds to the high degree
of discretion characteristically possessed by land use boards in softening the strictures of the general regulations they administer. '53 In
Suitum's case, both points had been met. First, there was a final decision regarding her land-nothing could be built on it. 5 4 Second,
there was no further decision to be made by the Agency regarding
Suitum's land. 55 The conflict between Suitum and the Agency was
therefore ripe for review. The Court dismissed the Agency's argument that Suitum needed to sell her TDRs and to have the purchaser's use of such TDRs approved by the Agency, in order to
determine the magnitude of Suitum's loss, and hence decide whether
or not such a loss constituted a taking. The Court found the question
of the value of the TDRs to be factual and for the jury.5 6 For the
purposes of the Takings Clause-i.e., judicial review of government
action-the crucial question was not the magnitude of the claimant's
loss, but how the government agency had in fact acted.
In sum, due to judicial concern for the ripeness of takings claims,
courts that reach the merits tend to review the agency that administers
the statutory scheme, not the legislature that authors the statute. As I
next discuss, the administrative emphasis of takings jurisprudence is
51 The Court cited Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) and MacDonald,477 U.S. 340 (1986).
52 See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1667.

53 Id.
54 See id.
55 See id. In the event that Suitum sold a TDR to a third party, that third party
would still have to seek the Agency's authority to use the TDR. Permission might or
might not be granted, depending on the circumstances. The Court found that this
did not constitute a decision regarding Suitum's land. At most, the risk that the
Agency would deny permission to use the TDR discounted the value of the TDR. See
id. at 1668-69.
56 See id.
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further reinforced by constraints on the remedial powers of courts
that hear takings cases.
C. Remedies and Ramications
At least in theory, successful takings claims may have two distinct
logical structures. Both sorts of claims begin with the propositions
that (a) "nor shall private property be taken, without just compensation,"57 and (b) property has been taken. The first sort of claim concludes therefrom that compensation is due, and prays for monetary
relief. The second sort of claim adds another premise: no compensation has been or will be paid. The second sort of claim concludes
therefrom that the government has acted unconstitutionally and prays
58
for equitable relief.
Procedurally, the difference between monetary and equitable relief may be the difference between federal courts. Takings claims for
compensation, if for more than $10,000 and against the federal government, are brought in the Court of Federal Claims and appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 59 Takings claims for invalidation, if against the federal government, are generally brought in
federal district court and appealed up through the regional courts of
60
appeals.
From the court's perspective, there is a somewhat subjective but
nonetheless substantial difference in character between grants of
monetary and of equitable relief. A grant of monetary relief means
that a particular claimant, but for the relief, would be forced to bear a
cost that should be shouldered by the public fisc. The validity of the
government's action is not in question. In contrast, an order based
upon a finding of constitutional infirmity challenges the validity of a
government action, and implies that a coordinate organ of the federal
government has acted outside of its powers.
61
Invalidation is always available. Since Marbuy v. Madison,
courts have had the right to declare government actions unconstitutional. The real question is whether a takings claimant may instead
pray for compensation. Until relatively recently, in constitutional
57 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
58 For these purposes there is no difference between injunctive and declaratory
relief.
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988).
60 There are exceptions. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the defendant in
Suitur, is an interstate agency, approved by Congress. Suitum sued for monetary
compensation, in federal district court, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct.
at 1663.
61 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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terms, it has been unclear whether the Fifth Amendment itself entails
a right to monetary relief.62 The Constitution prohibits the payment
of money from the federal fisc without the express consent of Congress. 63 One might think, therefore, that if Congress did not authorize the payment of compensation for property deemed to be taken by
government action, then the courts would be unable to grant monetary relief, and takings claimants would be forced to challenge the
validity of the government action in question.
The Supreme Court has provided two reasons why this is not the
case. First, the Tucker Act establishes that "[t] he United States Court
of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded . . .upon the Constitution

Regardless of the particular government action that gives rise
to the claim, takings claims are based upon the Fifth Amendment, and
hence "founded upon the Constitution" 65 (i.e., within the terms of the
Tucker Act).66 The Supreme Court has held that, in passing specific
legislation, Congress need not indicate an intention to make Tucker
"64
... .-

62 In 1975 a leading commentator maintained that the proper remedy for excessive limitation on the use of property was invalidation under what appears to be a
substantive due process analysis, rather than compensation:
[Ilf regulative legislation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as virtually to deprive a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his property, it comes
within the purview of the law of eminent domain. Such legislation is an
invalid exercise of the police power since it is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. It is invalid as an exercise of the power of eminent domain since no
provision is made for compensation.
1 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §1.42(1) (3d rev. ed. 1975) (quoted in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis omitted)). Stripping away the verbiage, it is worth noting that government actions that take all use of property are not
necessarily "clearly unreasonable and arbitrary." For example, FirstEnglish Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), involved a prohibition
on reconstruction of buildings on a floodplain, enacted after a fatal flood. Lucas
involved building restrictions enacted by the State of South Carolina in the wake of
Hurricane Hugo and its 29 fatalities and six billion dollars worth of damages in South
Carolina. SeeLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1037 n.1 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1075 & n.13 and accompanying text.
63 See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
64 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1998).
65 See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 267 (1946); see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940).
66 As a general matter, takings judgments are not paid from moneys appropriated
by the act authorizing the governmental action subsequently deemed a taking. Instead, Congress has established a judgment fund, out of which judgments adverse to
the government are paid. So, the requirement of Article I, § 9, that expenditures be
authorized by the legislature, has been met.
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Act remedies available to those whose property is taken by action of
the legislation. Absent explicit language to the contrary, Congress is
presumed to have intended Tucker Act compensation to be available. 67 The Tucker Act thus provides the judiciary with the authority

to grant monetary relief for takings claims against actions of the fed68
eral government.
The second source ofjudicial authority to grant compensation in
takings cases appears to be the Constitution itself. The Tucker Act
does not apply to the states. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,69 the Supreme
Court of California, sitting en banc, was "persuaded by various policy
considerations to the view that inverse condemnation is an inappropriate and undesirable remedy in cases in which unconstitutional regulation is alleged." 70 The court therefore held that "mandamus or
declaratory relief rather than inverse condemnation is the appropriate
relief under the circumstances. ''7 1 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the zoning law at issue in Agins did not work a taking.7 2 The Supreme Court therefore did not reach the issue of

whether the Fifth Amendment required the State of California to pro73
vide monetary relief for takings claims.

67 "The proper inquiry is not whether the statute 'expresses an affirmative showing of congressional intent to permit recourse to a Tucker Act remedy,' but rather
'whether Congress has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant ofjurisdiction
to the [Claims Court] to hear a suit involving the [statute] "founded... upon the
Constitution."'" Preseault, 494 U.S. at 12 (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126 (1974)). See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,

1018 (1984) (relying on Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases).
68 In the context of Bivens actions, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected an
invitation to issue money judgments against agencies without an explicit expression of
congressional intent to grant such damages. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486
(1994). ("If we were to recognize a direct action for damages against federal agen-

cies, we would be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal
Government.")

69 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), afrd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
70 Id. at 29.
71 Id. at 31. It could be argued that, because the California Supreme Court held
that the regulation did not work a taking, the discussion of remedies was dictum.
Subsequent decisions, however, have treated this discussion as a holding. See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 312 n.5
(citing cases).
72
73

See Agins, 447 U.S. at 259.
See id. at 263.
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The Agins rule was repeatedly challenged.7 4 In FirstEnglishEvangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 75 the Church owned a
summer camp, Lutherglen, that was built in a floodplain. In the aftermath of a major flood, the county adopted Interim Ordinance No.
11.855, which prevented the Church from rebuilding its camp. Litigation ensued. Claimants alleged that the Ordinance deprived them of
all use of the property, and that therefore they were due compensation. The California trial court sustained a demurrer to the effect
that, under Agins, claimants had to allege that the Ordinance was unconstitutional and pray for equitable relief.76 The court of appeals
77
affirmed on that basis.
The U.S. Supreme Court understood the question presented by
this case to be whether "the California Supreme Court erred in Agins
v. Tiburon in determining that the Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require compensation as a remedy for 'temporary' regulatory takingsthose regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the
courts."78 This was a stretch. Neither the California Court of Appeals
in FirstEnglish nor the California Supreme Court in Agins mentioned
temporary takings. On the contrary, in Agins the California Supreme
Court was concerned with long-range land-use planning. 79 Nor does
it make any sense to condition compensation for a temporary regulatory taking on a judicial finding of invalidity; presumably a regulatory
taking that was valid but only temporary also would be compensable.
Recourse must be had to the facts. The California Court of Appeals in effect held that the Church made a mistake in pleading.
Under Agins, the Church had to complain that the Ordinance was
unconstitutional, and it had not done so. The case had dragged on
for almost eight years. Even assuming that the Church was allowed to
amend its complaint, it would take more years to receive a final deci74

See FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 310.
Four times this decade, we have considered similar claims and have found
ourselves for one reason or another unable to consider the merits of the
Agins rule. See McDonald, Sommer &.Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340; Williamson County Regional PlanningComm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172; San
Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra; Agins v. Tiburon, supra.

Id.
75 See First English, 482 U.S. 304; see Michelman, supranote 14, at 1616 ("A little
work is required to produce a clear statement of the precise question decided by the
Court in this case.").
76 See First English, 482 U.S. at 309.
77 See id. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.
78 See id. at 310.
79 Agins, 598 P.2d at 29-31.
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sion. Suppose that the Ordinance worked a taking, and that if the
Church persevered, it ultimately would be successful.8 0 Then "compensation is not required until the challenged regulation or ordinance has been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a
writ of mandamus and the government has nevertheless decided to
continue the regulation in effect'

s

(i.e., the government decides to

exercise its power of eminent domain). If instead of exercising its
power of eminent domain, the State of California decided to rescind
the regulation, then the Church would receive nothing, even though
it had been deprived of the use of the land for years. This result is
what galled the Court: "Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor
ordinance after this period of time, though converting the taking into
a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of
the Just Compensation Clause."8 2 The State of California had to pay
compensation for the period of time-which might be years-between the government action and judicial determination that such action worked a taking. Therefore, equitable relief could not be the
sole form of relief for takings claims. The U.S. Supreme Court held
"that where the government's activities have already worked a taking
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
8s3
which the taking was effective.
In holding that the Fifth Amendment required post hoc compensation for the loss of property during the pendency of legal proceedings, the Supreme Court necessarily held that the Fifth Amendment
itself required a specific remedy--compensation-rather than equitable relief. No federal law was at issue. The State of California had no
provision for payment of regulatory takings claims, and indeed in this
case had determined that it was going to strike down its law rather
than enforce it and pay compensation. Therefore, the requirement
80 The Court explicitly reserved the questions of whether the ordinance in fact
took all use of the property away from the Church, and of whether the ordinance
might nonetheless be insulated from Fifth Amendment obligations to pay compensation as an exercise of the state's police power to ensure public safety. See FirstEnglish,
482 U.S. at 321.
81 Id at 308-09. As the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion later makes clear, the
government may respond to a determination that a regulation works a taking by exercising its power of eminent domain, paying compensation, and pursuing the policy
that occasioned the regulation. See id. at 321.

82 Id. at 319.
83 Id. at 321. In light of the fact that nothing in the case below indicated that the
Church would not be able to receive compensation for the loss of property during the
pendency of the legal proceedings, it is difficult to see how this could be the holding.
See id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that courts provide monetary relief in situations such as the one
presented in FirstEnglish could only come directly from the Constitution. This was a substantial extension of the traditional idea that the
Fifth Amendment is "self-executing."8 4 The Supreme Court quoted:
The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for
property taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of
its power of eminent domain. That right [is] guaranteed by the Constitution.... Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to

pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the
duty to pay imposed by the Amendment. The suits were thusfounded
upon the Constitution of the United States.8 5

But such language, like the Fifth Amendment itself, could be understood to impose a limitation on the extent of government power,
rather than to specify ajudicial remedy. The United States, as amicus
curiae, took just this position in First English.8 6 The Supreme Court
disagreed: "[I] t is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property rights."17

This "basic understanding of the

[Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
88
amounting to a taking."
There are problems. First, if the Fifth Amendment so clearly requires compensation rather than equitable relief, why do so many
cases, notably Pennsylvania Coal, grant equitable relief? Second, if the
Fifth Amendment is self-executing and requires the compensation
remedy, does it matter whether Congress has consented, in the
Tucker Act or elsewhere, to allow courts to enter money judgments
against the government? Would not a congressional effort to avoid
responsibility for paying compensation, as required by the Constitution, be unconstitutional on its face? And yet congressional consent
does appear to matter. A few years after FirstEnglishwas decided, the
Supreme Court in Preseault v. ICC noted that the Fifth Amendment
84 Id. at 315 (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)). See also
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947) ("The Fifth Amendment ex-

presses a principle of fairness and not a technical rule of procedure enshrining old or
new niceties regarding 'causes of action'-when they are born, whether they proliferate, and when they die."); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Taking
Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1659 (1988).
85 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933), quoted with approval in FirstEng-

lish, 482 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
86

See FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 315.
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was self-executing, and cited FirstEnglish. But the Court then went on
to discuss, at length, whether Congress, in passing the Rails to Trails
Act, had withdrawn Tucker Act authorization to grant money judgments against the federal government. Third, nowhere in FirstEnglish
does the Supreme Court flatly say that states cannot satisfy the Fifth
Amendment through the provision of equitable relief. And yet that
would seem to be the necessary result of the Court's language.8 9
What is the relationship between the two sorts of remedies: monetary compensation on the one hand, and equitable relief on the
other? In some situations, the government, not the court, may choose
the form of the relief granted by the court. A court may simply declare that a given action works a taking, and leave it up to the government to choose between either restoring the status quo ante or using
its powers of eminent domain to take title to the property.90 But as a
practical matter in cases involving the physical occupation of land,
paradigmatically the building of roads, the government may be forced
to pay compensation for the fee because the land has been rendered
unusable by the government action. Moreover, even in situations in
which the land could be returned, the government has paid compensation for taking the right of exclusive possession for a limited period
of time-i.e., the government has been held to take a leasehold interest rather than a fee. 91
The Court has also expressed the common law preference for
monetary over equitable relief. In Ruckleshaus the Court said that "Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private
property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking."9 2 In light of the fact that, as discussed above, a suit for
compensation can generally be brought against the federal government, the Ruckleshaus rule amounts to a requirement that claimants
pray for money in their first suit and challenge the validity of a federal
89 Justice Stevens, dissenting in FirstEnglish, maintained that "Itihe Court recognizes that the California courts have the right to adopt invalidation of an excessive
regulation as the appropriate remedy for the permanent effects of overburdensome
regulations, rather than allowing the regulation to stand and ordering the government to afford compensation for the permanent taking." Id. at 335.
90 See id. at 321; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
91 See First English, 482 U.S. at 320; see also United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26
(1958) ("In such cases compensation would be measured by the principles normally
governing the taking of a right to use property temporarily."); Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372
(1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
92 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (citation & footnote
omitted).
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governmental action in a second suit (or under a different clause).
The Court made this clear in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission,93 in which the claimants challenged the Rails to Trails Act as violative of the Takings Clause. 9 4 As discussed above, the Supreme Court
held that the Tucker Act provided a general authorization for the
treasury to pay judgments brought under the Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, the Preseaults' taking claim, if any, was for compensation
against the government in the court of claims, 9 5 and the challenge to
96
the validity of the Act was premature.
Taken together, the cases exhibit a clear trend towards compensation, and away from invalidation, as the appropriate relief for takings claims. Under current case law, the Constitution requires both
state and the federal governments to pay compensation for most takings. At least in the federal context, moreover, claims for monetary
compensation must be brought before claims for injunctive relief.
Monetary relief may foster the incremental virtues of the common law better than injunctive relief. Monetary relief allows courts to
make highly particularizedjudgments. In contrast, declaring a regulation valid or invalid is likely to decide a wide range of subsequent
cases brought under the same regulation. It would be difficult to imagine facts on which counsel could now responsibly challenge the
97
texts of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
the dredge and fill provisions of the Clean Water Act,98 or the Rails to
Trails Act,99 on their face. In contrast, many applications of a statute
are sufficiently new to support adjudication. 10 0 For example, in Dolan
v. Tigard, the Supreme Court recognized that "the authority of state
and local governments to engage in land use planning [without compensation] has been sustained against constitutional challenge as long
ago our decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co."101 The Court
93 494 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1990).
94 The Preseaults also claimed that the Rails to Trails Act represented an exercise

of Congressional power in excess of that ceded to the legislature under the Commerce Clause. That claim was dismissed. See i&. at 17.
95 Effective October 29, 1992, the United States Claims Court became known as
the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Federal Courts Administration Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §§ 804, 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (1992).
96 The Preseaults ultimately prevailed on their claim for compensation. See
Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
97 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264

(1981).
98
99
100
101

See United States V.Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
See Preseault,494 U.S. 1.
See Preseault, 100 F.3d 1525 (Rails to Trails Act).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
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then carefully reviewed the "adjudicatory decision" made by the City
Planning Commission in exacting conditions in exchange for the Dolan's building permit and decided that compensation was required.
In Dolan, the issue was not general legislative authority, but a particular administrative decision.
At least for most claimants, money provides not merely an adequate remedy, but a highly appropriate one. 10 2 Property ownership
affords the individual a range of possibilities, opportunities to exercise
the rights in the bundle. While government taking deprives the
owner of property, the payment of compensation preserves the
owner's range of possibilities, the freedom, that was secured by property ownership. Moreover, the fact that a takings claim is generally
not ripe until the taking actually occurs often makes injunctive relief
inappropriate for the claimant. Once the law has actually been applied-i.e., the claimant has in fact been deprived of property-the
claimant may be uninterested in challenging the validity of the legislative action. The land is flooded;10 3 the farm is lost; 0 4 the turkeys are

dead.' 0 5 After losing her property, however, the claimant may still be
very interested in compensation for her loss. Indeed, having suffered
an actual deprivation, even if the claimant maintained her facial challenge to the validity of the regulation, she would be virtually obligated
to bring a claim for compensation against the regulation as applied, as
06
well.'
The cases leading up to and including Preseault have laid the
groundwork for the generalization that contemporary takings challenges are requests that the court review the administration of government, awarding compensation if necessary, rather than review
constitutional validity of government action.
102 This is not to gainsay a central theme of this Article that the takings clause
must be understood as a constitutional constraint on government, not a guarantee of
individual welfare. See Rubenfeld, supra note 9 at 1142-44 (arguing that the Constitution's protection of the institution of private property is valuable because it restrains
government, not because it guarantees autonomy).
103 E.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
104 E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928).
105 E.g., Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Raynor v.
Maryland Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 676 A.2d 978 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)
(holding that killing of pet ferret for rabies testing was a valid exercise of police power
to prevent nuisance and therefore not compensable), cert. denied, 684 A.2d 454 (Md.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1428 (1997).
106 See discussion of FirstEnglish, supra note 80, and accompanying text.
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Larger Concerns in Ad Hoc Adjudication

Pennsylvania Coal and subsequent decisions have recognized that
the question of when a regulation goes too far cannot be answered in
the abstract, but instead requires case-by-case adjudication of government action, the patient calling of balls and strikes.' 0 7 To say that
takings judgments are ad hoc is not to say that no lesson can be drawn
from them. Taken together, ad hoc judgments form a body of prudential wisdom; such wisdom has traditionally been the virtue of the
common law.
Yet the ad hoc quality of takings jurisprudence has distressed the
scholarly community, and to a lesser extent, the judiciary.108 Judicial
insistence that each case be considered on its own merits sounds like
no more than a reminder of a fundamental principle of adjudicatory
justice, and does nothing to define the standards by which some
claims are judged meritorious and others are not. How are agents of
the government or private parties to know what distinguishes a regulation that requires compensation-a taking-from one that causes
only a mere diminution in the owner's fortunes, and requires no
compensation?
The question is best approached by examining the Takings
Clause as one of several ways for the judiciary to review government
action. In fact, a number of cases generally referred to in the takings
literature make little or no mention of the Takings Clause. 10 9 If one
considers takings law from the perspective of the judiciary rather than
that of the academy-i.e., actual cases rather than grand principlesit is quickly apparent that claimants often state other constitutional
107 See Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of NewYork, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(noting that the Court has engaged in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"); United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United States v. Caltex,
Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413

(1922) ("the question depends upon the particular facts").
108 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supranote 3, at 1700 ("ad hoc balancing is impossible
to reconcile... Takings law should be predictable") (footnotes omitted); Pennel4 485
U.S. at 16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that an ad hoc analysis should be limited to

regulatory takings cases).
109 See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that "court opinions often did not bother to mention exactly what provision of the
Constitution was violated" by takings claims); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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claims on the same facts as the takings claim. For example, the petitioner in Pennell v. City of SanJoseI"0 claimed that a rent control ordinance was compensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and violated both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A number of circuits have attempted to classify different approaches to takings claims. In Eide v. Sarasota County, Eide challenged
the zoning of his land in Sarasota, Florida, in federal district court."1
The Eleventh Circuit found that cases like Eide's could support four
challenges to a zoning ordinance: (a) 'just compensation," i.e., takings claims for money; (b) "due process takings," i.e., takings claims
seeking injunctive relief, (c) "arbitrary and capricious due process,"
sometimes called substantive due process claims; and (d) "equal protection claims." The Sixth Circuit, relying in part on Eide, characterized a similarly situated claimant's legal options somewhat differently
in Pearsonv. City of GrandBlanc.112 The Sixth Circuit found six categories of federal zoning claims: (a) "U]ust compensation takings;" (b)
"[d]ue process takings;" (c) "[a]rbitrary and capricious substantive
due process;" (d) "[e]qual protection;" (e) "[p]rocedural due process;" (f) "First Amendment." 1 3 Instead of curing ad hocery, considering the Takings Clause among other constitutional clauses animated
by related concerns only seems to obscure the substantive law in a
welter of causes of action.
The English legal historian Frederick Maitland famously said that
"[t] he forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves," meaning that the writ system informed the way English lawyers think." 4 A similar process is at work in constitutional law.
Although there is but one cause of action in federal civil cases, common law lawyers necessarily think in terms of cases. Cases, in turn, are
founded upon claims, which are derived from the language of the
Constitution as interpreted in earlier cases. This creates a bewildering
thicket of possible constitutional claims, and a case law in which, as
the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, "often one cannot tell which claim
has been brought or which standard is being applied.""15
110 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
111 Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1990). See also Executive 100,
Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991) (relying on Eide).
112 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992).
113 Id. at 1215-16.
114 F. W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF AC=ON AT COMMON LAw 296 (A.H. Chaytor &
W.J. Whittaker eds., 1920).
115 Eide, 908 F.2d at 722.
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Navigating this thicket is not always easy. Choosing the appropriate claim to bring-in the loose sense of argument rather than the
11 6
technical sense of writ-is a considerable part of the advocate's job.
From the perspective of the judiciary, deciding takings cases "calls as
117
much for the exercise ofjudgment as for the application of logic."
Nonetheless, it should be reassuring, rather than disturbing, that the
different parts of the Constitution are so harmonious that their roles
overlap. It is in part this complexity that has provided nuance and
flexibility to constitutional discourse.
Moreover, as discussed above, the very particularity of takings
cases stems from underlying similarities. First, takings claims are petitions for judicial review of government action. Second, due to both
the serious character of judicial review and the nature of the claims,
courts tend to review administrative actions taken rather than legislative pronouncements. Third, this emphasis on particular administrative action is further reinforced by the remedies available to courts. In
sum, the ad hoc quality of most takings decisions is inherent rather
than accidental.
To say that takings cases are particular by nature is not meant to
imply-as is too often suggested-that takings jurisprudence is unprincipled. Administrative takings jurisprudence can be fruitfully understood as judicial review of bureaucracy in the name of three
concerns: that government act in a manner befitting the situation at
hand ("due process"); that the law be applied fairly ("equal protection"); and that the administration of the law be publicly accountable.

116

Under a formal writ system, choosing the right claim might well be dispositive.
It is quite possible that a litigant will find that his case will fit some two or
three of these pigeon-holes. If that be so he will have a choice .... Or again
he may make a bad choice, fail in his action, and take such comfort as he can
from the hints of the judges that another form of action might have been
more successful.
MAITLAND, supra note 114, at 298. In the federal context, the choice of prayer may
determine the appropriate court, and even whether or not a suit can be maintained.
See 28 U.S.C. §1500 (1998) (depriving the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ofjurisdiction
during the pendency of the same claim against the United States in another court);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (defining
claim in terms of the relief sought).
117 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

A.

"DueProcess" Concernsfor the Conduct of Government

1. The Duet of Due Process and Just Compensation
As discussed above, the Fifth Amendment contains both the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause. It is therefore natural to understand the clauses as in some sense complementary constraints
upon the government's power to act. But determining how the
clauses complement each other is difficult. The meaning of each
clause has shifted over the decades, and so the relationship between
the clauses has changed.
By its terms, the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government. Until well into the twentieth century, the sorts of social and
economic regulation that might today be challenged as a taking were
largely the purview of the states. 1 18 Thus, until the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the question of the relationship between the
clauses did not exist with regard to state law, and was largely irrelevant
with regard to federal law." 9
The situation changed after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which contains the Due Process Clause but does not
contain the Takings Clause. By its terms, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to the states. For years after ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Supreme Court explicitly understood the Takings Clause to be a limitation on federal, but not
state, power. State power was limited by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which pointedly omitted the Takings Clause,
and by the state constitutions.120 In Mugler v. Kansas, long cited as a
takings case, Justice Harlan stated that:
118 There is some debate over the extent to which one can speak of takings claims
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. "Even after the establishment of a compensation requirement, it applied only to interference with physical ownership, and
government routinely acted in ways that diminished the value of private property
without providing compensation." Treanor, OriginalUnderstanding,supra note 19, at

785. But see Brauneis, supra note 19 at 686 (arguing that "regulatory takings" claims
were reviewable under other clauses).
119 See Sax, supra note 2, at 38 ("Because most of the takings cases have come to
the Supreme Court by way of state regulation, the bulk of 'early' authority in this field
is found subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.").
120 The district court for Kansasex reL. Tafts v. Ziebol, responding to an application
to remove the case to U.S. circuit court, was explicit. Its opinion is reprinted in
Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 277 (1887).
But the statesmen who framed the early amendments were at least as wise
and had as accurate an understanding of the import of the words in a fundamental law as any who have succeeded them. They were not given to a waste
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The general question in each case is whether the foregoing statutes
of Kansas are in conflict with that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "no State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
12 1
or property, without due process of law."
While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
imposed a constitutional limitation, reviewable in federal court, on
state government action, the scope of that limitation, and hence of
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, was not clear. These questions
were urgent. In the years before the Civil War, neither the federal
Due Process Clause nor the Takings Clause had attracted much attention.1 22 After the Civil War, however, the Supreme Court docket was
"crowded"1 23 with cases seeking judicial review under the new Due
Process Clause of state government actions. As one of the trial courts
below Mugler v. Kansas said:
But while [the Due Process Clause] has been a part of the Constitution as a restraint upon the powers of the states only a very few
years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are
asked to hold that State courts and State legislatures have deprived
their own citizens of life, liberty, and property without due process
of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some
strange misconception of the scope of the provision as found in the
fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character
of words, nor the useless and perplexing repetition of the same proposition
in different forms. They recognized the fact that private property might be
taken for public use under regular process without just compensation, and
also that a man might be deprived of his property without due process of
law, and yet obtain compensation therefor to the full measure of its value;
and the federal government was inhibited from both of these forms of injustice, while the states were left free to establish such rules on the subject as
they deemed proper.
Id.
121
122

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887).
See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877). The Court noted:
It is not a little remarkable, that while this provision has been in the Constitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal
government, for nearly a century, and while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that government have been exercised has been
watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its
branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in
the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public discussion.
Id. at 103-04 (quoted with approval in Kansas ex reL Tufts v. Ziebold, reprinted in
Mugler, 8 S.Ct. at 277).
123 Id. at 104.
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of many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in them,
that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of
bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court of justice of the
decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which
124
such a decision may be founded.
The Supreme Court was thus confronted with the question-what was
the scope of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause?-and more specifically-did the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause entail the rights against the state governments secured against the federal government by the Takings Clause?
The Court assumed, without much difficulty, that taking property for
a nonpublic purpose violated the Due Process Clause. 125 Litigation
centered on whether or not various schemes intended to achieve a
collective good that benefited some far more than others, such as the
creation of an irrigation district 26 or the drainage of a swamp, 127 were
in fact for a public purpose. This left indecided, however, the question of whether state government takings for concededly public purposes were reviewable in federal court under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1897, the Supreme Court, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
v. Chicago,128 concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause entailed the notion that a state government's takings of property without compensation gave rise to a federal cause of action:
In our opinion, ajudgment of a state court, even if it be authorized
by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under
its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured
to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due
process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment
124 Id. at 104.
125 See Falibrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
It is claimed, however, that the citizen is deprived of his property without
due process of law, if it be taken by or under state authority for any other

than a public use, either under the guise of taxation or by the assumption of
the right of eminent domain. In that way the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material in this
court, even where the taking is under the authority of the State, instead of
the Federal, government.
Id.
126 See id.
127 See Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885).
128 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

746

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

74:3

by the highest court of the State is a denial by that State of a right
129
secured to the owner by that instrument.
The Court discussed at length its abhorrence of uncompensated
takings, and in effect concluded that if "due process" meant anything
"substantive,"13 0 it meant that state government could not take property without just compensation. Although the Supreme Court cited
Mugler v. Kansas for another proposition, the Court did not discuss
the question that preoccupied the trial court in Mugler (but on which
the firstJustice Harlan, for the Supreme Court in Mugler, was silent),
viz., why the Fifth Amendment included a Takings Clause but the
Fourteenth Amendment did not. In fact, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R does not mention the Fifth Amendment at all, and for many
years after that case was decided, the Supreme Court was careful to
distinguish cases brought against states under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from those brought against the federal
government under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Many early cases that are currently regarded as takings cases, most
notably Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,13 1 were in fact decided under
the rubric of other clauses. 132 Over time, however, Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy RI. has come to stand for the proposition that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence is incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment and conditions both state and federal government action.133 Thus, both the Takings and the Due Process
Clauses apply to state and federal government, and the question of
the relationship between judicial review under the two clauses, once
hardly worth asking, has become pressing.
The language of judicial review is a bit misleading. First, judicial
review is not a single process applicable to all claims. Courts subject
different sorts of cases to different levels of scrutiny. Thus, it would be
129 Id.at 241.
130 See id. at 235 ("In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to
substance, not to form.").
131 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
132 Pennsylvania Coal was decided under the Contract and Due Process Clauses.
The Fifth Amendment was mentioned once. See also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153
(1921) ("[T]he question is whether the statute is constitutional, or, as held by the
Court of Appeals, an attempt to authorize the taking of property not for public use
and without due process of law, and for this and other reasons void."); Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 653 (1887) (Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
133 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
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more accurate to speak of judicial reviews in the plural. Second, and
even more importantly, scrutiny is not a process of inquiry, but rather
one of decision. Government actions receive a level of scrutiny commensurate with the likelihood that the action is constitutionally impermissible. Race-based classifications receive strict scrutiny because
they are rarely permissible; ordinary economic regulations receive little scrutiny because they are usually permissible.
Because all government actions must be taken with whatever legal
process is due, suits brought under the Due Process Clause span the
spectrum of levels of scrutiny. The Due Process Clause requires that
the government's proceeding be appropriate to the individual interests affected by the government action. So, for example, suits which
may result in incarceration-a deprivation of physical liberty-require
a panoply of procedural safeguards. 3 4 Deprivations of lesser interests
require fewer procedural safeguards, 3 5 and regulations that merely
cost money require only that the state "could rationally have decided"' 3 6 that the action in question might achieve the state's purpose
in order to pass judicial review. Due process challenges thus involve a
whole range of standards of review-i.e., challenged government actions are more or less likely to be permitted by courts-depending on
the constitutional interests at stake.
The standard of judicial review appropriaite under the Takings
Clause is unclear and has only in the last few years received much
attention. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the appellants challenged a city
zoning ordinance that restricted their previously purchased tract of
1 37
land to construction of single-family homes on relatively large lots.

The Supreme Court established that a taking occurs if the regulation
precludes all use of the land or does not "substantially advance legiti-

134 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy
trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring law enforcement officers
explicitly to warn in-custodial defendants of Fifth Amendment rights); Gideon v.

Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
135 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down a
city ordinance requiring that only a single family live in each housing unit as violative
of Due Process Clause); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring a hearing
before termination of welfare payments).
136 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (emphasis
omitted). See also id. at 461 ("[T] he standard of review applicable to this case under
the Equal Protection Clause is the familiar 'rational basis' test."); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); LAURENCE TIME, AMEIvcAN CONsTITUToNAL LAW § 16-2, at
1440 (2d ed. 1988).
137 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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mate state interests." 138 Emphasizing the importance of protecting
open-space land, the Court upheld the ordinance because "the zoning
ordinances substantially advance legitimate governmental goals."1 39
In Nollan v. California CoastalCommission,1 40 the California Coastal
Commission conditioned a development permit for a beachfront
house on the landowner's grant to the public of an easement long
the beach. The Coastal Commission maintained that this condition
was necessary in order to preserve visual access to the beach, i.e., so
that from the street in front of the Nollans' house, people might look
across the beach and see the ocean. The Supreme Court held that the
condition was a taking because no "essential nexus" 141 existed between the government's express purpose, to provide a view across the
Nollans' property to the ocean, and the requirement of allowing third
parties to walk alongside the ocean on the Nollans' beachfront property. 142 The court required the government action to be aligned with
a permissible government purpose. "In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an
14 3
out-and-out plan of extortion."'
44
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,1
the Supreme Court required a "rough
145
proportionality"'
between administrative means, i.e., the exaction
demanded and the burden on legislative ends imposed by the proposed development. The City Planning Commission of Tigard, Oregon, imposed several requirements on the granting of the Dolans'
permit to expand their store and adjacent parking lot, including the
deed of an easement from the Dolans to the city for the construction
of a bicycle pathway. 4 6 The city argued that these requirements were
necessary to control flooding and reduce traffic congestion. The
Court acknowledged the importance of such purposes, 1 47 but held
that "on the record before us, the city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development reasonably relate to the city's
138

Id. at 260. See also Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 127 (holding that a restriction on

use may be a taking "if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose").
139 Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
140 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
141 Id. at 837.
142 See id.
143 Id. (citation omitted).
144 512 U.S. 374 (1994).

145 Id. at 391.
146 See id. at 379.
147 See id. at 396 (acknowledging "the commendable task of land use planning").
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requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway
148
easement."'
With some reference to the practices of the various states, 149 the
Court described the fit between regulatory means and policy ends expected of land use planning commissions:
We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates
what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 150
This heightened scrutiny raises at least three problems. First, it
may be argued that the Court has resurrected "a species of substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago."' 5 ' Land
use regulations are exercises of the state's police powers. In reviewing
particular exercises of such power, the Supreme Court has generally
required only that the state "could rationally have decided" 5 2 that the
action under review would bring about a legitimate government end.
The analyses in Agins, Nollan, and Dolan are clearly far more substantive. In each of these cases, the Court asked, in effect, if the agency's
action made sense. In other circumstances, however, the Supreme
Court has expressly declined to "sit as a super-legislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation [or] to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare . . . . 53 Why is substantive due
process review defensible in the context of takings cases, and indefensible elsewhere?
Second, why is the quality of agency decisionmaking relevant to a
finding that a given government action constitutes a taking? After all,
148 Id. at 395.
149 See id. at 385; see also Robert H. Freilich &David W. Bushek, Thou Shalt Not Take
Title Without Adequate Planning: The Takings Equation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 27
URB. LAW. 187, 194 (1995) ("The majority of state development exactions cases ad-

dress whether the dedication or fee requirement is excessive. This determination is
reached by evaluating the exaction under proportionality standards, which consider
the nature and amount of the exaction in relation both to the impacts generated by
the development project and the benefit derived from the exaction.").
150 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
151 1d. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("IT]he Court imposes a
standard of precision for the exercise of a State's police power that has been discredited for the better part of this century.").
152 Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (emphasis
omitted).
153 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 74:3

the Takings Clause requires compensation regardless of the propriety
of the government action. Land seized to build a badly needed road
is no less requiring of compensation because the agency judiciously
decided that the road was needed. 154 Either property is taken by government action, or it is not. If it is taken, compensation is owed, if
not, not.
Third, what is the relationship between review under the Takings
Clause and the minimal due process review that courts use to assess
the propriety of economic regulations passed under the police power?
These objections are not fatal; some degree of heightened scrutiny seems justifiable. "Substantive due process," as that term is currently understood, requires courts to subject government action to
only minimal scrutiny, so-called rational basis review. Under this standard of review, courts will uphold government action if there is any
rational basis for believing that the action will further a permissible
public purpose. The Takings Clause applies to property taken for
public use. The Supreme Court has equated the Takings Clause requirement that property be taken for public use with the Due Process
155
Clause requirement that the government act with public purpose.
Therefore, any regulation that has been passed with due process of
law-i.e., that survives rational basis review-has a sufficiently public
use to satisfy the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause does not impose
a higher standard of public-mindedness on government action than is
required by the Due Process Clause. A regulation passed in the public
interest, and therefore valid under the Due Process Clause, may nonetheless require compensation under the Takings Clause, because it
takes private property for public use. The paradigmatic taking, the
condemnation of land to build a road, generally serves a public usesurvives rational basis review-and nonetheless requires compensation. Rational basis review is thus inadequate to determine which regulations work takings and which do not. Therefore, deciding takings
claims must require scrutiny more exacting than substantive due process (rational basis) review.
Judicial review of bureaucratic action under the Takings Clause is
also different from the great due process cases of the "Due Process
Revolution." Administrative takings cases differ from due process
cases in the claim of right and in the remedy sought. If an administrative action takes rights that constitute private property, and claimants
154

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (noting that action aimed at benefiting public

interests does not necessarily affect government's requirement to pay).

155 See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Peterson, supra note 7, at 149.
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seek monetary relief or invalidation of the action, courts may review
the action under the Takings Clause. If, on the other hand, government action takes rights without providing a hearing or other legally
required process, then a procedural due process challenge is appropriate. For example, in the landmark procedural due process case
Goldberg v. Kelly, 15 6 the plaintiff claimed to have been wrongly denied
his welfare benefit. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause required the administrative agency to provide the claimant
with a hearing. Goldberg v. Kelly thus involved the right to process,
specifically a hearing, and only indirectly, if ultimately, the claimant's
financial interest in the entitlement itself. In contrast, once a claimant has made out a prima facie case in an administrative takings review, the court is the forum for the claim that a property right has, in
fact, been taken. 157 The claimant seeks money damages, not an injunction that the administrative agency improve the procedures with
1 58
which it governs the claimant.
The Takings Clause thus imposes requirements on government
action over and above the basic constitutional requirements of public
purpose and due procedure. 159 The substance of those requirements-and the level of scrutiny to which government actions will be
subjected-is unclear, and has to date been discussed in contrast to
standards of review in more settled areas of the law. The Supreme
Court in Nollan said that:
156 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157 The GoldbergCourtunderstood Kelly's welfare benefit as property. Subsequent
procedural due process cases tended to regard the interest as a liberty-rather than a
property, interest-thereby making less obvious the connection between Due Process
and Takings Clause review of agency action.
158 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (en banc), was decided
on the basis of the precedent in Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). In Thornton, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the general public had a right of access
to the dry sand area and beachfront lots throughout Oregon. Claimants in Stevens,
who were not parties to Thornton, alleged that application of the Thornton understanding of real property in Oregon to them constituted a denial of due process. Justices
Scalia and O'Connor agreed. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207
(1994) (dissent byjustice Scalia, joined by justice O'Connor, from a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari); see also Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396 (6th Cir.

1994).
159 In Patel v. Penman, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause the Takings Clause
'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against the type of
conduct challenged by the Patels, that clause preempts the Patels' substantive due
process claim." Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted),

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997); see alsoArmendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th
Cir. 1976) (en banc).
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[O]ur opinions do not establish that these standards are the same
as those applied to due process or equal protection claims. To the
contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have generally
been quite different. We have required that the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be
achieved, not that "the State 'could rationally have decided that the
1 60
measure adopted might achieve the State's objective."
The Court went on to discuss Justice Brennan's dissent, which
relied on an equal protection case and two substantive due process
cases:
But there is no reason to believe (and the language of our cases
gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of
property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process
challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical; any more
than there is any reason to believe that so long as the regulation of
speech is at issue the standards for due process challenges, equal
protection challenges, and First Amendment challenges are
identical.1 61
In sum, the same regulation may affect a number of constitutional interests, and it is the interests affected that determine the level
of scrutiny to which the regulation is subjected by courts. Economic
regulations which would otherwise receive only rational basis review
may be subjected to stricter scrutiny because they disturb one of these
interests. Property rights are constitutionally protected interests. As
the Supreme Court said in Dolan:
But simply denominating a governmental measure as a "business
regulation" does not immunize it from constitutional challenge on
the ground that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights.... We
see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as
much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in
these comparable circumstances.

1 62

Consequently, if a claimant can make out a prima facie case that a
government action has taken a property interest, then the claimant
may have the government action reviewed. The claimant's allegation
that a property interest was taken triggers heightened judicial scrutiny
of the government action. Heightened judicial scrutiny, and hence
any practical chance of recovery, thus appears to be logically depen160
tions
161
162

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987) (citaomitted).
Id.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
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dent on a colorable claim that government regulation, restriction of
the use of property, amounts to a taking of property. The big question that haunts takings jurisprudence-what is property?-seems
both unavoidable and unanswerable. The following section suggests
how the question is elided.
2.

Defining Property in Takings Cases

Administrative takings claimants often claim that their "reasonable expectations" regarding their property rights have been frustrated by government action. 163 But property rights-and conversely,
the government's obligation to pay-are based upon more than owners' expectations. A property owner cannot expect to use property to
create a nuisance, and government action taken to prevent the nuisance cannot be characterized as taking.' 64 Activities are deemed to
be nuisances depending on their circumstances. What constitutes a
nuisance, then, changes over time, as the circumstances of the activity
change. Therefore, regulation to prevent nuisances sometimes prohibits activity that had been permissible. A transfer of land that once
might have been considered within the realm of acceptable contractual negotiation-a surface owner's sale, to the owner of the mineral
rights, of the right to support the surface of the earth165-may come
to be considered a public nuisance, and hence not open to private
negotiation.166 A building that once might have been torn down with
impunity may come to be considered a landmark, and its future uses
may be limited. 167 As products of politics, property rights are creatures of history, and so subject to change.
In markets that are constructed around ongoing government regulation, private undertakings whose expectations are disappointed by
regulatory changes are unlikely to have cause for complaint under the
163 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also
Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality opinion by
Plager, J.,joined by three judges, and two judges concurring separately) (noting that
the subjective expectations of the property owner are irrelevant).
164 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992)
("Only on [a showing of public nuisance] can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing."); see
also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887);
Sax, supra note 2, at 48-50.
165 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). One might argue,
however, that the nuisance alleged in Pennsylvania Coal was not real. See Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
166 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-93; M &J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
167 See Penn Centra4 438 U.S. 104.
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Takings Clause. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that employers must expect changes, even expensive ones, with regard
to their pension obligations. 168 Chemical companies have limited expectations in the secrecy of their formulae. 169 Mining companies who
file claims on federal land have no property interest beyond the scope
of the law setting forth the metes and bounds of their patents to
mine. 170 Banks cannot assume that their right to exclude others includes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 171 A central issue
in each of these cases is whether or not the regulation interfered with
expectations sufficiently concrete to be understood as property: if not,
no taking can have occurred.
As these cases also illustrate, however, expectations are not attached solely to the physical objects of property rights, the land,
houses, and other items that are affected by regulation. There are
also important expectations of government. Government is expected
to regulate the negative externalities of land use (to prohibit nui72 government is expected to protect the cultural heritage of
sances) ;1
the nation; 173 government is expected to regulate industries like banking. 17 4 In short, the expectation of government action may preclude

the formation of the publicly settled expectations of stable relations
75
that constitute property rights.'
Yet our government is also expected to be limited in scope, to
leave substantial compass for private action. 176 It is the responsibility
of government to maintain the stability of the general order relative to
168 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prod., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,
508 U.S. 602, 645-46 (1993) (finding no reasonable expectation in light of congressional legislation in the pension field); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986) (same).

169 See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984). Note that
intellectual property in chemical formulae is also protected by the patent system. The
acquisition of a patent requires disclosure of that which is to be protected; patents are
public documents.
170 See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985) ("Claimants thus must take
their mineral interests with the knowledge that the Government retains substantial
regulatory power over those interests.").
171 See California Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
172 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992).
173 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-35 (1978).
174 See CaliforniaHousing Securities, 959 F.2d 955.
175 For discussion of the literature dealing with the relationship between rational
expectations and appropriate property entitlement, see Kaplow, supra note 9;
Michelman, supra note 2.
176 "Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern." Nebbia v. New

3999]

ADMINISTRATIVE TAKINGS

the designs of private interests, so that individuals may pursue what
they desire secure in the knowledge that the government will not act
capriciously towards them. 77 The settled expectancies that constitute
property change, if at all, in arboreal fashion, incrementally. The Takings Clause requires that government action that disrupts rather than
conserves the stability of this general order must be viewed with suspicion. Should government disturb these expectations too abruptly,
compensation is owed.' 7 8
At few points in the American legal tradition is stability more expected than it is with regard to regulation of land. It could be argued
that, in the wake of both the environmental movement and Hurricane
Hugo, people in South Carolina no longer thought of owning a piece
17 9
of beachfront as they thought of owning real property elsewhere.
Consequently, the restrictions imposed on Lucas's beachfront lot by
the state's regulation did not compromise his property interests. The
U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas, however, viewed property as essentially
static. The Supreme Court held that state legislatures cannot change
an institution of property (without paying for the change), but can
only articulate the common law. The only question was whether doctrines of nuisance already restricted building on beachfront land in
the manner intended by the statute. The Supreme Court therefore
remanded Lucas in order to find out whether or not the statute reflected the established understanding of ownership of beachfront
land in South Carolina. On remand, the state Supreme Court held
that the understanding in South Carolina, before passage of the statYork, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (holding regulation of contracts appropriate in the
circumstances of the case).
177 See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1214-18 (understanding individual anxiety
over possible appropriation as a disutility cost).
178 Widespread consensus exists that abrupt changes wrought by the government
to property rights are compensable. Robert Brauneis argues that Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coa, was solely concerned that the courts be able to restrain the government
from abrupt redefinition of property rights:
[C] ourts should presume that certain basic principles embedded in standing
positive law reflect the settled will of those dominant forces., Although gradual legal change is inevitable, sudden changes that drastically undermine
basic principles, unaccompanied by compensation to disadvantaged parties,
should be struck down as inconsistent with the settled will of the community
Brauneis, supra note 19, at 642. The proposition that even slow changes to property
rights are compensable is more controversial; resolution of this controversy requires a
jurispruddntially satisfying account of the genesis of property entitlements, an account beyond the scope of this article.

179 SeeJoseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433 (1993).
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ute, of fee simple title to beachfront property did not restrict the
owner's liberty to build single family dwellings.1 80
The law is different in Oregon. The Supreme Court of Oregon
held in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach'8 ' that public access to the drysand areas of the Pacific shore inheres in the title of shorefront property in Oregon. The Supreme Court of Oregon expressly referred to
the so-called "nuisance exception" set forth in Lucas, i.e., that otherwise compensable regulatory constraints on the use of property were
not compensable if the regulation merely restated the common law of
nuisance, or, more generally, reflected preexisting "background principles"-i.e., property doctrines-that determined the scope of the
property rights possessed by the landowner. In Oregon, the state
Supreme Court said, landowners of oceanfront property did not have,
and never had, the right to exclude others from access to the dry-sand
areas of the beach. Therefore, a denial of a permit to build a wall
82
which would so exclude the public was not a taking.'
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Supreme Court spoke of the
"weighing of private and public interests" required to decide takings
cases.' 8 3 This formulation is misleading, because public and private
interests are not necessarily opposed. Someone whose house is taken
to build a road may well use that road. More fundamentally, a court's
weighing of public and private interests should always indicate that
the government action should be taken. First, takings are compensable even if the public interest in taking the action is overwhelming.
Second, determining the public interest is the primary job of the political branches, not the courts. Third, if the action were not in the public interest, it would be illegal under the Due Process Clause, not the
Takings Clause. The fundamental tension confronted in Agins and
other takings cases is actually between settled expectations and gov180
181

See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (en banc). See also McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d

714 (Or. 1989) (en banc).
182 The claimants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and
were denied. Justice Scalia (the author of Lucas), joined by Justice O'Connor, dis-

sented from the denial of the petition. Justice Scalia questioned the Oregon Supreme
Court's use and understanding of Oregon cases, and strongly suggested that the Oregon Supreme Court was "invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law." Stevens
v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994) (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia's willingness to judge the Oregon court's understanding of Ore-

gon property law is difficult to square with traditional understandings of federalism,
under which states define property law. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism,
andJurisprudence:A Comment on Lucas andJudicialConservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301 (1993); Sax, supra note 179.
183 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
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ernment actions to improve the status quo.' 8 4 Because settled expectations regarding particular property rights are held most dearly by
their owners and government actions are taken presumably at the behest of the electorate, however, the Agins formulation is not too wide
of the mark. Takings cases do exhibit a tension between private and
public interests, even if the "balancing" that courts must undertake is
more accurately described to be between conflicting expectations of
stability and change.
In the famous 1798 case Calderv. Bull,1 85 the Supreme Court was
asked whether another constitutional mediation between continuity
and change, the prohibition on the passage of ex post facto laws, was
general, or was restricted to criminal law.' 8 6 In deciding that it applied only to criminal law, Justice Chase noted:
The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the
depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision,
"that privateproperty should not be taken for PUBLIC use, without
8 7
just compensation," was unnecessary.1
By constitutionally providing for just compensation, Justice Chase
argued, the founders made clear their understanding that the federal
government would, on occasion, have to take property, and so upset
88
settled expectations.'
The question of whether private property is at issue would seem
to be logically antecedent to any takings decision. But from a realist
perspective, property ultimately is defined as a bundle of enforceable
rights, that is, in terms of how an organ of government, a court, will
act. Thus, in reviewing the actions of coordinate branches of government, courts may, to the frustration of academics, jump the metaphysical question: what is property? Instead, courts may review
government action directly: should the government compensate the
claimant? If the answer is yes, then it must be said, in the course of
granting relief under the Takings Clause, that the government took a
184 See Sax, supranote 2, at 48 ("[T]he taking provision is undoubtedly an attempt
to find some fair balance between the forces of change and the security of established
interests ....

).

185 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
186 This appears to have been a matter of some dispute at the Constitutional convention. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the NaturalLaw of Property, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 367, 374-75 (1991).
187 Calder,3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 394.
188 Justice Iredell agreed with this much of Chase's position. See id. at 400.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 74:3

property interest. Successful takings claims define property rights as
much as the other way around. The circularity is complete. 189
Considerations in Determining the Process Due
The Takings Clause mandates judicial oversight of the prudence
with which government agencies help weave the social fabric. In assessing the prudence of an agency action, the question for the court is
whether the agency acted with the deliberation required by the circumstances. Review of the somewhat inchoate process of deliberation
is notoriously difficult. It is also, of course, what courts do all the time,
and the burden of what courts of appeals do. An exhaustive list of the
considerations, much less a theoretically satisfying schema, of what
courts should consider when they review administrative actions challenged under the Takings Clause is probably impossible. Nonetheless, a few aspects of the administrative process are dispositive of
takings claims often enough to warrant mention.
3.

a. What is the Nature of the Property Right in Question?
Both courts and commentators have noted judicial solicitude for
the right to exclude others from land. 190 Regulations that abrogate
that right have been described as "categorical" takings. 191 "In general
(at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute
the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind
it, we have required compensation."'192 The Supreme Court has been
189 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts
allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what
courts say it is.").
190 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 14, at 1612 (discussing Nollan).
191 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
192 Id. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982). Although perhaps often compensable, the right to exclude others from land
is not absolute. In the exercise of its police powers, government may "invade" land in
a variety of circumstances, for example, to fight fires, to pursue suspected criminals,
and to give succor in medical emergencies, without compensating the landowners.
Moreover, owners of businesses retain considerably less than plenary rights to exclude
others from the premises. For example, the owner of the mall in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robbins invited "the public" onto the premises, and could not thereafter exclude well-mannered members of the public who wished to exercise their First
Amendment rights. See Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that under the commerce clause, Congress could require restaurants to accept customers of all races);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that under the
commerce clause, Congress could require hotels to accept guests of all races).
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similarly solicitous of the rights of owners to profit financially from
their property. The Court said in Lucas that "[t]he second situation
in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
93
land.'U
The Lucas Court defined "categorical treatment" as "compensible
without case-specific inquiries into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint." Lucas contrasts this categorical approach
with over seventy years of "ad hoc, factual inquiries' undertaken to
resolve takings claims in other areas.19 4 This bifurcation between ad
hoc balancing cases, necessarily messy, and principled "categorical"
cases, is profoundly misleading. First, as discussed above, the public
interest, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with whether or not a
takings claim is compensible. Few, if any, takings decisions turn on
judicial evaluation of the "public interest advanced in support of the
restraint.' 95 Such a decision would raise serious separation of powers
concerns. Second, all successful claims are "categorical." The courts
have seldom, if ever, awarded compensation in a land case that could
not be characterized as a taking of all of a right, usually to exclude or
to profit. Litigation therefore centers around the struggle to define
the adverse effect of the challenged government action as a deprivation of such a right. If the claimant is successful in doing so, then the
government-action taking represents a complete destruction of the
right, and courts will award compensation in full view of the fact that
the action was in the public interest, i.e., categorically. Third, it is
wrong to suggest, as Lucas does, that the Court's review is less factspecific when the right to profit or to exclude is at stake. The treatment of state government action in Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas was
hardly categorical. In each of these cases, the Court subjected state
government actions to reviews sufficiently exacting to be characterized
by responsible observers as revivals of substantive due process.
Courts have shown less solicitude for the rights of owners to
profit in any specific way. In FloridaRock, a mining company claimed
193 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. SeeAgins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
The rights to descent and devise have also been zealously protected under the takings clause. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987). Both Babbitt and Hodel invalidated escheat provisions of the Indian Lands
Consolidation Act under the takings clause. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66
(1979) (holding a regulation that destroyed all economic value of certain personal

property was not a taking in part because the rights of descent and devise were
undisturbed).

194 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
195 Id
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that denial of its right to mine destroyed all value in the property,
even though evidence was presented that the land was worth a considerable amount of money on the speculative real estate market. The
mining company also argued that a speculative real estate market
could not provide compensation. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit responded: "Dollars are fungible; a speculative market
provides a landowner with monetary compensation which is just as
satisfactory as that provided by any other market. Should a landowner
wish to pick and choose her buyers, that luxury is not chargeable to
the federal fisc.' u 96 The Federal Circuit remanded for consideration

of whether or not the mining company would suffer any loss if the
land were sold as real estate. In effect, the mining company had no
claim to the preservation of its activity, mining.
b. What is the Character of the Government Organ in
Question?
The "sovereignty of the courts" 19 7 implicit in the process of judicial review is problematic for a nation that conceives of itself as a republican democracy. 198 Majoritarian objections to judicial review of
government action are somewhat attenuated by the bureaucratic character of administrative takings cases. In hearing administrative takings
claims, courts review the exercise of powers twice delegated, first by
the people to their representatives, and second by the political
branches to the bureaucracies that actually do much of the work of
government. In Dolan, the Supreme Court distinguished general zoning laws, created by legislative bodies, from the administration of the
zoning laws by city zoning boards:
[I]n evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the
burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to
prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights.
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city. 199
Here again is the distinction between legislation and administration, between the creation of law and the applicationof the law. At least
since Euclid, the Supreme Court has held that localities could zone196 Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
197 See Edward H. Levi, The Sovereignty of the Courts, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1980);

H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969 (1977).
198 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1936).
199 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994).
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i.e., restrict the uses to which property could be put-without paying
landowners for resulting diminutions of property value. The Dolan
Court distinguished Euclid and like cases by saying that such cases "involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of
the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel." 20 0 The Dolan Court thus announced that courts are to scrutinize the application of zoning laws more carefully than they examine
the creation of such laws.
Legislatures, executives, and their agents make different kinds of
decisions, and they do so with different levels of political accountability. There is no reason for courts to review all institutions with the
same level of scrutiny.2 0 1 Dolan strongly suggests that judicial scrutiny
bears an inverse relationship to the political accountability of the government organ in question. If the governmental organ is directly responsible to the electorate, then judicial oversight is usually
unnecessary, and its exercise raises questions about the separation of
powers. For this reason, judicial invalidation of legislation is a rare
and grave event, and the burden of production is squarely on the
claimant. 20 2 Conversely, judicial oversight is necessary, indeed required, insofar as the governmental organ is insulated from political
processes. In such cases, the burden of production may shift to the
20 3
bureaucracy that has impaired the property rights.

200
201

Id. at 385.

Not even all legislatures are the same.
[T]akings jurisprudence should not assume that all governments are identical in takings questions and should therefore look more closely at the governmental entity doing the taking. Citizens may be protected against federal
legislative takings by the Madisonian safeguards accompanying a large and
diverse legislature; there may be other types of protections against takings
available at the local level. A sensible jurisprudence should not assume that
what constitutes a taking of property at the federal level is necessarily a taking at the local level, or vice versa.
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CL. L.
REV. 561, 598 (1984) (footnote omitted).
202 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectowv.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
203 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987); Dolan, 512
U.S. at 391 n.8. For discussion of the standard of review set forth in the Dolan opinion, see Freilich & Bushek, supra note 149.
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Did the Governmental Organ Give Private Parties Reason to
Assume That It Would Take a Particular Course of
Action?

The administration of law is often thought of as the rule of a distant authority, a judge, who lays down the law among strangers. However apt this description may or may not be of trial courts, this
imagery is often unsuited to the administrative context. Much administrative action is negotiated between regulators and members of a
regulated community who must work together for extended periods
of time. In such a context, fair dealing is absolutely necessary to both
the efficacy and the efficiency of the regulatory process.
The Supreme Court has on occasion discussed the relationship
between the right to compensation and the government's obligation
to deal fairly in terms of vested property rights, and at other times has
20 4
used more explicitly contractual language. In Lynch v. United States,
Congress had established life and disability insurance programs for
veterans under the War Risk Insurance Act. Thereafter, in order to
save money, Congress passed the so-called "Economy Act, ' 205 which
statutorily repudiated congressional obligations to pay claims on
yearly renewable term insurance.2 0 6 The Supreme Court held that the
veterans' expectations of benefits were property, and that congressional repudiation of its decision was therefore a taking. The
Supreme Court found that "War Risk policies, being contracts, are
property and create vested rights." 20 7 "The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken without making just compensation.
Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the United States. Rights against the
United States arising out of a contract with it are protected by the
20 8
Fifth Amendment."
The Supreme Court has also found takings in situations which,
while not precisely contractual, have strong elements of contract. The
claimants in Kaiser Aetna v. United States20 9 were told that they could
dredge their lagoon and build a marina that opened out onto navigable waters. Only after the work was done were the claimants told that
204 292 U.S. 571 (1934). But see Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 57 F.3d 505,
510 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 211 (1986) as overruling Lynch), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 672 (1995).
205 Lynch, 292 U.S. at 575 (citing Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 3, 48 Stat. 8).
206 See id. (citing § 17 of the Economy Act, 38 U.S.C. § 717).
207 Id. at 577.
208 Id. at 579.
209 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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they had to allow the public to use the marina. The Supreme Court
said that:
While the consent of individual officials representing the United
States cannot "estop" the United States, it can lead to the fruition of
a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property"expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must
condemn and pay for before it takes over the management of the

210
landowner's property.
Similarly, in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,2 11 the
Supreme Court held that treaty obligations between the federal govemnment and the tribe created property interests. Those interests
were subsequently taken by the federal government in its abrogation
of its treaty obligations, and the tribe was consequently owed
22
compensation. 1
The labeling scheme for the marketing of pesticides in the
United States established by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) required manufacturers of pesticides to disclose trade secrets to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Under certain circumstances set forth in the statute, the trade secrets
might be disclosed to the public, destroying their value. Monsanto, a
pesticide manufacturer, challenged FIFRA as a taking. In Ruckleshaus
v. Monsanto,21 3 the Supreme Court acknowledged that trade secrets
were property under state law, and hence protected by the Takings
Clause. But Monsanto knew that disclosure of trade secrets to the
EPA would, in some circumstances, involve disclosure of the secrets,
and therefore their loss. Monsanto voluntarily disclosed its trade
secrets in order to participate in the labeling scheme and to be able to
market its products in the United States. In years for which the EPA
provided an "explicit guarantee" of secrecy, however, disclosure of the
2 14
trade secrets constituted a taking.

210

Id. at 179 (citations omitted).

211 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
212 See id. at 424. In United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), the Supreme
Court held that the constellation of statutes and regulations establishing federal responsibility for Indian lands created a fiduciary relationship between the federal government and the Indians. Breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the government to
the Indians gave rise to a cause of action for damages. For discussion of Lynch, Sioux
Nation, and Ruckleshaus, see Peterson, supra note 7, at 123-29.
213 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
214 See id. at 1010-14. Monsanto further argued that conditioning its ability to
participate in the U.S. market or surrender its property rights was an unconstitutional
condition. The Supreme Court observed:
Monsanto has not challenged the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the marketing and use of pesticides. Nor could Monsanto successfully
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These aspects of regulation that in fact receive judicial scrutiny in
takings cases should not be considered-either jointly or in conjunction with one another-to be "tests" as the word is too often used in
the legal profession; that is, as algorithms for deciding cases. Instead,
the considerations discussed above should be considered "tests" as the
word is used in the medical profession: as methods for inquiry into
the exercise of bureaucratic power, and so into the health of the body
politic.
B. Equal Protection Concerns
1. Introduction
Takings jurisprudence contains echoes of equal protection rhetoric, talk of not requiring a few people to bear burdens which, "in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 2 1 5 It
seems intuitively obvious that the Takings Clause requires that individuals bear no more than their fair shares of the cost of governance.
But while individuals should not have to shoulder the full cost of public action, it seems unarguable that the costs of such action will not fall
evenly across the population. And even if-miraculously-the cost of
each government action were evenly apportioned and distributed
among the population, would that be fair in a world where the ability
of individuals to bear a cost varies widely? Fair distribution of the
costs of government action thus seems to be both important and inadequate to inform our understanding of takings cases.
Another set of problems with constitutional efforts to constrain
the government's powers to take-i.e., to redistribute outcomes generated by the market-is that at a certain level the government and
make such a challenge, for such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear
in exchange for "the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community."
Id. at 1007 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
215 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (quoted with approval in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)). See also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Coucil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicts, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986); Ruckleshaus v. Monstanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
986 (1984); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 n.23 (1984); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 140, 148 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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the market are difficult to tell apart. The market is suffused with government activity. Most obviously, taxes and subsidies constantly redistribute outcomes generated by the market. More importantly, as the
realists made clear, the economy cannot be understood without reference both to current legal entitlement, which is the product of past
politics, and to private expectations about future government activity.
Conversely, markets suffuse politics: the operation of the economy
transforms standards of acceptable use. Of particular importance in
the takings context, urbanization and heightened public solicitude for
dwindling wild spaces may render inappropriate uses that were once
perfectly acceptable.2 16 Gravel pits become suburban developments; 2 1 7 land that was once thought to be good for limestone mines

is bought by real estate speculators.2 1 8 These changes bring considerable profits, as well as costs, to the property owners in the area. The
law must recognize, and formalize, the social changes wrought by economic activity. Political and market activity, manifested by law and
price, thus interpenetrate each other. The simplistic but common notion that the Takings Clause prohibits political redistribution of marketplace decisions is to some extent true, but suffers from the
inadequacies of a description of society as a polar opposition between
the "state" and the "market."
These objections, however, are far removed from the bump and
grind of takings litigation. Courts are quite capable of discussing
whether a particular outcome is fair, even if they may not be able to
generalize such judgments and produce a compelling theory of justice. Similarly, distinguishing government action (the taking) from
marketplace outcome (the private property) is not difficult in an actual case. In practice, the Takings Clause is, in some important sense,
about the judicial review of the allocations that society makes through
its political institutions, as opposed to its market institutions. Takings
jurisprudence requires, as a logical antecedent, that the concepts of
"law," "politics," and "market" can be meaningfully distinguished from
one another. Otherwise, legal standards could not be applied to government actions that take property, thereby changing the situation
established by the action of the market. But only by looking at how
administrative takings claims actually challenge government action
can we discern the standards by which government action is judged.

216

See Sax, supra note 2, at 49.

217 See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
218 See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995).
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Discrimination and Reciprocity

Regulations with relatively narrow application are more apt to be
held takings than similar regulations with broader application. The
Supreme Court in Dolan noted that a land use regulation that "involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of
the city" were more likely not to require compensation than more narrowly applicable regulations. 219 A regulation that applies to many
people more closely approaches "the public as a whole. '2 20 Conversely, a regulation that applies only to a few people, particularly if
others benefit from the regulation, is likely to be deemed an abuse of
political power, discrimination against some in favor of others. 221 It is
fair to say that the Takings Clause serves as a constraint upon discriminatory regulation, if we pay special attention to what is meant by "discrimination" in the context of the governance of competitive
markets-that is, markets in which actors generally occupy unequal
positions.
The Supreme Court has often considered the local effects of regulation under the rubric of "reciprocal advantage" in order to deny
takings claims, most famously in upholding a generalized scheme of
zoning.22 2 If a regulation is likely to provide considerable benefits to
219 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
220 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
221 Discrimination here means unfairness or inequality which is created by government action in a morally defensible effort to realize a policy, not "invidious discrimination," a putatively legal expression of prejudices which have traditionally been
appealed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Treanor would reconfigure takings law to accommodate currently noncompensable claims discussed under the rubric of environmentaIjustice. A showing of political
process failure should occasion judicial review under the takings clause of decisions to
locate environmentally undesirable facilities in minority neighborhoods. Members of
"discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938), should receive compensation because they cannot organize themselves and protect their interests in the political arena. See Treanor, Original Understanding, supranote 19, at 872-78. To my knowledge, no court has attempted to mate
the takings and equal protection clauses so forcibly. I strongly suspect, however, that
any effort to mitigate racism by providing an equivalent-compensation-would itself
be a violation of equal protection. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The extent to which decisions to locate an environmentally undesirable facility are
influenced by political prejudice is very difficult to determine. See, e.g., Vicki Been &
Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A LongitudinalAnalysis of
EnviromentalJusticeClaims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997); Vicki Been, Locally Undesireable
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:DisproportionateSiting or MarketDynamics?, 103 YALE
L.J. 1383 (1994).
222 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicts, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987); Agins v. City of
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the affected property owner, then the property owner has been, in
effect, compensated in kind, and has no claim for monetary compensation. Writing for the Court in Pennsylvania Coa4223 Justice Holmes
distinguished Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,224 a case in which the
Supreme Court upheld a regulation that required coal companies
whose mines abutted one another to leave pillars of coal between the
mines untouched, in order to form a "sufficient barrier for the safety
of the employ~s of either mine in case the other should be abandoned
and allowed to fill with water."2 25 Such a requirement "secured an
average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as ajustifi226
cation of various laws."
But mere inequality without reciprocity of advantage does not
give rise to a successful takings claim. Even a statute that defines and
economically disadvantages a minority, for example, opthamologists
and optometrists, may be without constitutional remedy. 227 The right
to compensation in administrative takings claims tends to arise from
the differential application of the law to parties similarly situated
under the law. Imagine the paradigmatic taking: a state needs land
for a road. A variety of routes are possible; one is chosen. The people
whose land is taken simply happen to be in the way of a road that the
political authorities deem necessary. In some sense, such landowners
are discriminated against vis-a-vis their neighbors. While that discrimination is valid, it requires compensation. Suppose, for example, the
public has decided, through statute, that the draining of wetlands
228
needs to be controlled, even at considerable economic expense.
This legislative tradeoff between wetlands and other goods tends to be
rather general. Particular tradeoffs-can this wetland be drained or
will this limestone operation be prohibited?-are usually made by a
bureaucracy. 2 29 The public justifiably expects that such particular decisions will be made in a manner that reflects the statutory mandate of
the agency. Obviously, more ecologically significant wetlands ought
to be privileged over less ecologically significant ones; more economically sensible development should be favored over less. The policy
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-35 (1978).
223 Pennsylvania Coal Co: v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
224 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
225 Id. at 533.
226 Pennsylvania Coal 260 U.S. at 415.
227 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
228 See, e.g., Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
229 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 301, 502 (1988) (making the Army Corps of Engineers responsible for the permitting process).
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thus impels discrimination against lesser wetlands and mining operations. In some situations, relatively unprincipled discrimination may
be necessary. To carry the foregoing example forward, imagine that a
city decides that it needs to limit the number of limestone mining
operations in the area in order to protect the municipal aquifer.
There are twelve local mining operations; the city decides that the
water supply can sustain the operation of six. The city also needs
limestone for building. None of the limestone mining operations are
either disproportionately harmful to the aquifer, or economically beneficial to the community. It would be environmentally disastrous to
allow all the operations to continue, economically disastrous to shut
them all down, and unfair to deny some permit applications and grant
others. Yet six operations must be shut down. In short, enforcement
of the law may require an agency to discriminate among parties who
have equally worthy claims. In such situations, the Takings Clause
may require compensation, i.e. may force buy-outs, in effect culling
the herd of competitors without unjust discrimination.
C.

Administrative Law Concerns

As a practical matter, the mediation between conflicting expectations of stability and change at issue in regulatory takings cases is done
mostly by agencies. Statutes often grant agencies the authority to administer legislative policy over time. Elected officials in the executive
branch necessarily trust bureaucracies to do the daily business of governing. As discussed above, courts tend to consider the effects of
agency decisions already taken: whatever mediation between legal
right and political imperative courts may undertake tends to be occasional and after the fact. Although judicial decisions may have prospective effect, those effects are relatively limited by the ad hoc
character of administrative takings decisions. So, on a daily basis, it is
agencies themselves which decide whether their exercise of power is
so abrupt as to upset property rights.
Administrative takings law is thus largely the compilation ofjudicial reviews of the way agencies exercise their power to mediate between past rights and future policy. The discussion so far has
examined judicial review animated by concerns more familiarly expressed under other clauses of the Constitution, and has argued that
takings jurisprudence is uniquely situated to express such concerns in
the administrative context. Despite these similarities of purpose, however, judicial review of bureaucracies under the Takings Clause operates in a fundamentally different way from review of legislative action
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
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The Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause impose
constitutive restraints on government. Claims brought under those
clauses challenge whether the government may act in such a manner
at all. The question is absolute, and the remedy sought-an order
forbidding the action, or a declaration that the action is illegal-is
consequently absolute. The idea that compensation, standing alone,
could remedy violations of due process or equal protection is repellent. With regard to these questions, once a court decides what the
Constitution demands, the court must so decree.
In contrast, an administrative takings claim presumes that the
governmental interest is legitimate, that the action taken to achieve
that interest is valid, and that the agency should continue to take similar actions, as required by its mandate. The question posed by an administrative takings claim is whether a government action nonetheless
takes a claimant's property right and so requires compensation. This
is an ad hoc judgment rather than a decision on general principle.
Each pitch must be called a ball or a strike; each case must be judged
anew. This occasional quality, rather than an inability to reach doctrinal consensus, is the reason that courts have insisted on case-by-case
adjudication in takings claims. The "rule" announced in Pennsylvania
Coa that "if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking, '28 0 no more decides cases than the rule that a ball thrown
through the strike zone will be counted a strike. Holmes himself
noted that "this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. '28 ' The occasional nature of administrative takings claims precludes the grand adjudication-and the
absolute remedies-associated with the other constitutional
clauses. 232 Administrative takings claims do not prohibit classes of
agency action, but instead scrutinize particular agency actions in a
public light.
Public scrutiny is a good thing for administrative agencies, because bureaucratic activity tends to be unaccountable. Many bureaucrats toil in relative obscurity and are unknown to the public they
serve. Professional bureaucrats are unelected and the amount of control that elected officials in practice exercise over bureaucrats varies
widely. Civil servicejobs are secure, and therefore bureaucracy is relatively immune from the constraints of the market. This combination
230 Pennsylvania Coal 260 U.S. at 415.
231 Id. at 416. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases.").
232 Holmes may well have believed that necessary deduction was impossible in
legal reasoning, which operated on the basis of analogy. See Brauneis, supra note 19,
at 637.
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that obscurity and security creates has its dangers. Administrative
agencies are susceptible to lobbying, which need not be nefarious but
is usually the influence of groups with interests different from the policies the agency exists to further. Special interest groups can be condoned more easily in the legislative context, because the excesses of
special interest groups should be checked by the accountability of the
legislature to the voters, or by the countervailing efforts of opposing
factions. 233 But bureacracies, in contrast, have no voters, and because
their processes are not necessarily open, factions may have difficulty
opposing and so neutralizing one another. Because administration is
insulated, in contrast to the legislative process, the administration of
law may be more susceptible to abuse by particular interests, and the
abuse may be harder to cure, than is the drafting of law. Consequently, administrative agencies should be subjected to heightened
review.
Administrative takings claims remedy failures of day-to-day governance, rather than failures of democratic authority. In Dolan, the
Supreme Court distinguished "legislative determinations classifying
entire areas of the city" from "an adjudicative decision" regarding a
single parcel, between the plan devised by the city's elected officials
and a specific application of that plan by the City Planning Commission.23 4 The general zoning plan was democratically approved; the
exaction in the Dolan case was not. Injunctive relief-judicially mandated violation of the zoning plan-thus more directly contravenes
the will of the electorate than the requirement of compensation. 235
Administrative takings claims subject bureaucracy to three sorts
of scrutiny. First, the prosecution of a takings claim requires the
agency to defend its actions in open court. An administrative takings
claim thus subjects an agency to public scrutiny of particular decisions. Because the court's decisions may be published, the scrutiny of
the agency policy is not only public, it may be durable. Second, if an
agency is required to pay compensation for a taking, the agency places
a demand upon the public fisc. If money is spent, elected officials and
ultimately taxpayers will pay attention. In an age of deficit anxiety,
agencies cannot afford to take property-i.e., spend money-without
being sure that they are realizing a policy for which a political demand
233 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
234 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
235 One might respond that judges are even more insulated from both political
and economic controls than other civil servants, and therefore should not be given
power over political decisions. But judges are held accountable largely by the fact
that they are constantly subjected to public scrutiny, and that their most important
work product, opinions, are read daily by other lawyers.
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exists. Takings law thus subjects an agency to democratic scrutiny.
Third, and more subtly, administrative takings claims may signal the
agency, either through public or fiscal embarrassment, that it needs to
devote more care to its decisions. 2 6 Judicial review under the Takings
Clause, requiring compensation instead of invalidation, "is a way of
opening a dialogue between branches of government on constitutional principle of a sort whose importance to restrained judicial theory was properly emphasized by the late Alexander Bickel. To put the
point in Bickelian terms, compensation law may serve as a passive virtue-albeit of a relatively active sort. '23 7 Without some mechanism
such as that provided by takings law, bad agency decisions cost the
agency nothing but goodwill, and the agency decisionmaking process
is easily compromised. Rephrased, the risk of successful takings
claims provides agencies with incentives to make defensible decisions.
In requiring agencies to provide the public with information in
order to ensure good government, takings cases serve the same ends
as the statutes that regulate the government bureaucracy by requiring
agencies to provide information, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 8 the Freedom of Information Act,23 9 and the National Environmental Policy Act. 240 Takings law has even incorporated a key

administrative law device, the requirement that agencies assess the impact of proposed action on policies. In a 1988 Executive Order, President Reagan required federal agencies, to take "due regard for the
constitutional protections provided by the Fifth Amendment and to
reduce the risk of undue or inadvertent burdens on the public fisc
resulting from lawful government action." 24 ' The Order requires that
federal agencies assess, in light of recent takings cases, whether or not
proposed regulation is likely to work a taking. As the Order makes
clear, failure to consider the local effects of regulation on the regulated community powerfully suggests that the administrative agency is
derelict in its duties. Like the administrative law statutes, the Takings
Clause acts to ensure that the agency action is scrutable, either
through agency payment of compensation or through judicial review
of agency failure to pay compensation.
236 This does not apply to cases of necessary discrimination, discussed in Part II.B,
supra.
237 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 48. The reference is to'ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
238 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994).

239 Id at § 552.
240 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47, 4361-70 (1994).
241 Exec. Order No. 12,630, "Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights," 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
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CONCLUSION

The adjudication of takings claims in the regulatory state presents
problems that already existed when the activities of government could
be thought to run in just three courses-in the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches. And yet the constitutional task of compelling
government to exercise its power over individual lives in deliberate,
fair, and open fashion is the same, regardless of the aspect of government under review.
In general, government must be able to show that its actions do
not upset the settled expectations that constitute property too abruptly, or else a presumption arises that the action requires compensation. Due to its remedial flexibility, the Takings Clause is well-suited
to judicial review of particular bureaucratic actions. Considerations
relevant to judgment include the nature of the private interest affected, the political accountability of the agency, and the commitments made by the government.
In a world of competition for scarce resources, government will
often be forced to limit the size of markets. In order to do that, discrimination among existing participants in the market will be necessary. Frequently, there will be no rational basis on which to choose
among competitors. A limited number of permits-permissions to
carry on the activity-can be distributed, and there are many applicants whose claims are worthy and who have much invested in the
matter. If the law requires administrative choices among such competitors, compensation is due.
Finally, the Takings Clause is not addressed solely, or even primarily, to courts. Instead, it imposes an obligation, across the many
organs of government, to mediate between settled commitmentsproperty-and society's efforts to improve itself-policy. That obligation, in an open society, must be publicly perceived to be fulfilled.
Administrative takings law can thus be understood as a reprise of
the three "constitutional moments" that inform our political self-understanding. 242 The Fifth Amendment, with its concern for how the
242

The phrase "Constitutional Moment" is Bruce Ackerman's. See Bruce Acker-

man, ConstitutionalPolicies/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1988); Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1164 (1988) [hereinafter
Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments] (deciding that the "Reagan Revolution" was

not, in fact, a Constitutional Moment, leaving the familiar tripartite periodization of
American constitutional history intact); BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). Ackerman's constitutional theory has inevitably drawn criticism from
within the coiterie. See, e.g., William W. Fisher, III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 955 (1992); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass
R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreward: Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit
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power of government is applied to the individual, was ratified along
with the Constitution itself. The Fourteenth Amendment, with its
concern that government treat citizens fairly, was ratified in the wake
of the war over equality, the Civil War. The great administrative statutes, passed in response to the emergence of modern government's
assumption of vast social responsibilities, have endeavored to ensure
that government not become too distant, too obscure, too alien to
those it is meant to serve. By forcing bureaucratic action to be defensible, fair, and open, administrative takings law furthers each of these
constitutional efforts.
A coda: it has been suggested that a number of contemporary
political events, such as the Supreme Court decisions in United States v.
Lopez2 43 and Printz v. United States,2 44 the congressional elections of
1994, the promulgation of the Contract with America, and even the
Reagan Presidency, together might comprise a fourth "constitutional
moment," the reconfiguration of the federal government by "We the
People." 245 I doubt this. But if we have begun the fourth age of

American political history, and if this age is characterized by the People's desire to constrain the power of bureaucracy-presumably in an
effort to unshackle themselves from their own government, grown
alien-then it seems inevitable that the Takings Clause will be understood as the constitutional expression of that desire.

State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996). The tripartite periodization of American constitutional history punctuated by the these Constitutional Moments, however, has not
been much criticized. But see Michael McConnel, The Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment,
11 CONST. COMMENTARY 115 (1994). The tripartite periodization is not Ackerman's
invention, but instead dates back to the Realists. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CoNTRAcr (1974); KARL N. LLEwLLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS

(1960).
243 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
244 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
245 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463 (1996); Symposium: The New Federalism After United
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. L. REv. 633 (1996) (especially Mark Tushnet, Living in a
STUDY

ConstitutionalMoment? Lopez and ConstitutionalTheory, id. at 845); Sunstein, supra note

242, at 257; Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, supra note 242.
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